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ABSTRACT 
Since 9/11, the United States implemented radical changes to its counterterrorism 
strategy and capabilities.  Recently, critics have called into question the current strategy 
for fighting a war on terror.  This thesis provides a summary of the two most common 
competing criticisms of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  On the one hand, critics 
argue that the threat has been exaggerated.  On the opposite side of the spectrum, critics 
argue that we are engaged in a war between Islam and the West.  An examination of the 
evidence used by these competing criticisms, combined with a review of existing U.S. 
strategies, provides a foundation for the construction of an appropriate response to 
terrorism.   
This review reveals evidence that the threat should be evaluated differently for 
domestic and international counterterrorist threats.  Internationally, the U.S. engaged in a 
battle with a radical Islamic insurgency.  Domestically, the terrorist threat is made up of 
terrorist operators who are engaged in a wide variety of criminal activity.  Although the 
U.S. is unprepared for the external threat posed by radical Islamic insurgents, the post–
9/11 enhancements to homeland security are appropriate to meet the current domestic 
threat.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What are the competing views of the terrorist threat to the United States?  What 
evidence is used to support those views?  What are the policy implications of the various 
perspectives?  
B.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
For decades, the United States has struggled to categorize the actual threat posed 
by terrorism.  On September 11, 2001, the U.S. determined the threat was real and 
significant.  As a result of the attacks, the U.S. government declared a “War on Terror.”  
During the past six years, the U.S. government has implemented radical policy changes to 
confront and prepare for terrorist attacks.  These changes included initiating foreign wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and implementing institutional changes within the U.S. domestic 
intelligence, law enforcement and emergency response communities.  Since these 
changes were instituted, the U.S. has not experienced a significant domestic terrorist 
attack.   
Recently, public debate has called into question the validity of the U.S. 
government’s evaluation of the terrorist threat.  All sides of the debate agree that the 
threat is real; however, they disagree about the actual threat level and the policy 
implications of the threat.   This debate can be broadly placed into two main categories: 
those who believe the threat has been exaggerated and those who believe we are still 
unprepared to deal with the threat.     
On one side, critics believe the U.S. government has exaggerated the actual threat 
to America.  As a result, the critics charge that the U.S. has overreacted with its response 
to terrorism.  This group argues that our current solutions to terrorism may be more 
harmful to the U.S. than are the terrorists themselves.     
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On the other hand, a group of critics believes the U.S. is engaged in a worldwide 
battle between democracy and radical Islam.  This group believes that, in effect, we are 
involved in a “clash of civilizations” — a battle for the survival of our current way of life.   
This group argues that the U.S. has failed to adequately prepare itself for this 
confrontation.  As a result, our current strategy leaves us vulnerable. 
Regardless of their assertions, both sides believe the U.S. has inappropriately 
responded to the terrorist threat.  Both groups rely on a wide variety of evidence to 
support their assertions.  An examination of this evidence should assist the U.S. in 
developing an appropriate response to terrorism.   
C. ARGUMENT  
For decades, the U.S. has been forced to deal with a wide variety of terrorist 
threats.  These threats included, but were not limited to, white supremacist groups, Puerto 
Rican separatists and radical Islamic organizations.  Recognizing the differences in each 
threat, the U.S. utilized multiple counterterrorist techniques, operations and strategies to 
contain these threats.  Through this process, the U.S. learned that what worked against 
white supremacist groups might not work against animal rights extremists.  On 
September 11, 2001, the rules for fighting terrorism changed again.     
Immediately after the attacks, the U.S. focused all of its energy into the 
identification of the perpetrators of the attacks and the prevention of further attacks.  To 
address the threat, the U.S. implemented radical changes to confront and prepare for 
terrorist attacks.  These changes were consolidated into a “War on Terror.”   As a result 
of the “War on Terror,” the U.S. initiated two foreign wars and instituted revolutionary 
changes to the U.S. Intelligence Community and other federal government organizations.   
Lately, critics have argued that the “War on Terror” is an inadequate response to 
the threat we face.  These criticisms focus on the terrorists’ ability to conduct attacks in 
the U.S. and the U.S.’s ability to identify and neutralize those threats.    
These critics can be placed into two main categories.  One group believes that the 
threat has been exaggerated.  These critics point to a lack of evidence that documents the 
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terrorist threat.  They cite that the U.S. has not identified any terrorist “sleeper cells” 
within the United States.   Furthermore, they argue that the U.S. has not had a significant 
terrorist attack since the fall of 2001.  Despite this lack of evidence, the U.S. has devoted 
a disproportionate amount of resources into combating a limited threat.  Some of these 
changes include the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s shift in its primary focus from law 
enforcement to intelligence, the U.S. creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).   
On the state and local level, each state has appointed a homeland security advisor.  
These homeland security advisors are supported by over forty homeland security fusion 
centers.  These centers very in scope and mission; however, each fusion center was 
designed to support a perceived lack of threat-related intelligence.  These critics argue 
that, in general, we have wasted our time and money on most homeland security 
enhancements.   
The second group believes the U.S. is engaged in a worldwide battle between 
democracy and radical Islam.  This confrontation is a “clash of civilizations.”   This 
group argues that the U.S. is not doing enough to prepare itself for this confrontation.  
These critics argue that a political and philosophical vacuum was created after the end of 
the Cold War.  They believe this vacuum has been filled by a renewed cultural 
resurgence.  These cultural identifications can be grouped into various civilizations.  A 
clash between two of these civilizations, Western and Islamic, has resulted in our current 
battles against radical Islamic terrorism.  They believe we currently face a battle for our 
very existence.  They argue that we are at a significant disadvantage.  They argue that our 
democratic principles inhibit our ability to identify and confront the threat.  
Consequently, they argue that we must radically alter the way in which we confront this 
threat.  They believe that there is no room for compromise.  Radical Islamic terrorists will 
not stop until our culture is destroyed and/or subjugated to an Islamic Caliphate.    
Regardless of their criticisms, both sides agree that a terrorist threat exists and that 
the U.S. is not adequately protecting its citizens.  An evaluation of both arguments, and 
their supporting evidence, indicates that both groups believe domestic counterterrorism 
operations have negligible impact on the overall terrorist threat.  Proponents of the 
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overblown theory argue that there is an extremely limited domestic threat, while 
advocates of a “Clash of Civilization” model believe the threat, and their solutions, exist 
outside of the U.S.   Consequently, an effective U.S. counterterrorism strategy should 
reflect these beliefs.  Both critics agree that the U.S., as a society and a civilization, will 
not be destroyed by 9/11-style attacks.  As a result, it is imperative that we design a 
strategy does not incorporate actions that could diminish our society’s core beliefs.    
A new strategy would acknowledge that, regardless of our counterterrorism 
efforts, the U.S. is vulnerable to terrorist attacks and that these threats originate from 
outside of the U.S.  As a result, most of our counterterrorist efforts should focus on the 
overseas detection, prevention and disruption of terrorist threats.  Domestically, the U.S. 
should limit its counterterrorism efforts to mechanisms that support internationally 
identified terrorist threats.  Prevention operations should be clearly linked to established 
and documented threats.  As currently designed, our domestic counterterrorism 
operations are designed to minimize our vulnerability.  Regardless of the threat, the U.S., 
unfortunately, will remain vulnerable to terrorism.  Vulnerability will never be an 
accurate measure of success against terrorism.  Consequently, a vulnerability-based 
counterterrorism strategy is ultimately un-winnable.  Only through this acceptance, will 
the U.S. be able to design a more productive counterterrorism strategy.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
For decades, the United States has continually questioned its assessment of the 
threat posed by terrorist organizations.  With the attacks on 9/11, the U.S. view of the 
threat was significantly altered.  To confront the perceived threat, the U.S. drastically 
altered its counterterrorism strategies and capabilities.  Since the implementation of these 
changes, many critics have called into question effectiveness of these changes.  This 
thesis focused on a review of two prevalent criticisms: first, the threat has been 
exaggerated; second, the threat has been understated.   Regardless of the evaluation of the 
threat, both groups of critics believe the current U.S. counterterrorism strategy is 
inappropriate.   
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In drafting the thesis, the author focused on interviews of current and former 
international, federal, state and local law enforcement and intelligence executives, 
analysts and agents.  These interviews were undertaken to establish their perceptions of 
the current threat environment posed by radical Islamic terrorists.  These interviews were 
conducted with over twenty employees within the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National 
Counterterrorism Center, the Office of the National Intelligence Director, the Department 
of Defense, state and local law enforcement and foreign liaison intelligence and security 
services.   The individuals interviewed included a combination of operational, 
intelligence and policy-level executives.  The expansive variety of interviewees allowed 
the author to develop an extensive review of counterterrorism perspectives.   Special 
emphasis was placed on the current threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists and the 
effectiveness of current U.S. counterterrorism strategies as applied by counterterrorism 
professionals.   During the interviews, the author solicited the interviewees’ current 
viewpoints and recommendations for improving U.S. counterterrorism operations.   
Research and study also included an analytical review of congressional testimony, 
public statements of domestic and international counterterrorism community 
stakeholders, and detailed analysis of various written and electronic media, including 
magazine and newspaper accounts, various periodicals and books, published studies, 
monographs and reports, and review of unclassified, internal government documents.  
Specific research included a review of national- and state-level counterterrorism strategic 
and operational documents.   
The literature review included a analysis of the Presidential Directive 39, the 1996 
Report from the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
Intelligence Community, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 9/11 
Commission Report, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the report 
from the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Regarding Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004, the 2005 
National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, the 2006 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, the 2007 National Security Strategy for Homeland Security, the 
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2007 National Intelligence Estimate on the Terrorist Threat, the Department of Homeland 
Security Strategy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Strategic Plan 2004-2009, the New 
Jersey State Police Practical Guide to Intelligence-led Policing, and the New York Police 
Department’s “Radicalization in the West.”  These documents provided a foundation for 
most national counterterrorism operations.  The literature review also included a review 
of prevalent criticisms of our current counterterrorism strategy.  This included statements, 
testimony, articles, and books by Michael Chertoff, Bernard Lewis, George W. Bush, 
George H. W. Bush, Samuel P. Huntington, Tony Blankley, Michael Scheuer, Charles E. 
Allen, John Mueller, Edward Lustick, Eliza Manningham-Buller, Zbigniew Brzezinski 
and William Jefferson Clinton.   
This thesis was also shaped by the author’s experiences as a police officer with 
the U.S. Park Police and as a Special Agent with the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.  For over sixteen years, the author has served in several 
counterterrorism-related positions within these organizations.  These positions ranged 
from a patrol officer, a Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force, a Supervisory 
Special Agent in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and his current position as the 
FBI’s Senior Liaison Officer to the Department of Homeland Security.   These positions 
have provided the author with a unique view of the growth and application of the U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy.  
In the thesis, I conducted a policy options analysis of U.S. domestic counterterrorism 
strategies.  This policy option analysis begins with an exploratory study of commonly held 
beliefs regarding the terrorist threat to the United States.  This was accomplished through a 
review of existing research.  This review included an extensive literature review combined 
with interviews of individuals who are currently, or have been in the past, involved in the 
development and/or management of strategic level domestic counterterrorism operations and 
initiatives.   
I compared the following strategies: 
1. The current domestic counterterrorism strategy as it is reflected in existing 
domestic operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence.  
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2. A domestic counterterrorism strategy that incorporates the suggestions of 
proponents who believe the terrorist threat has been exaggerated. 
3. A domestic counterterrorism strategy that incorporates the suggestions of 
proponents of the “clash of civilization” model of terrorism. 
4. A domestic counterterrorism strategy that reflects a synthesis of solutions 
proposed by critics who advocate the battle is a “clash of civilization” and those who 
believe the threat has been exaggerated.  
E. LIMITS AND SIGNIFICANCE  
1. Limits 
The U.S. government’s response to the attacks of 9/11 has come under significant 
public scrutiny.  To date, most literature on this topic provides a focused evaluation of 
select criticisms.  Comparisons are utilized only to strengthen one’s position, as opposed 
to identifying common goals or solutions.  Much of the current literature focuses on the 
underlying politics associated with domestic counterterrorism strategies and not factual 
assessments.  On the whole, these documents provide a wide variety of criticisms with 
limited practical policy applications.     
Because of the classified nature of most counterterrorism threat assessments, I 
was forced to rely exclusively on open source documents.  This limited the scope and 
depth of the terrorist threat assessments discussed in the thesis.  All of the interviews 
conducted for this thesis were documented at an unclassified level.  Although limiting, I 
believe the open source documents and assessments utilized in this thesis provided an 
appropriate foundation for the discussion of the current U.S. counterterrorism strategy.     
2. Future Research Efforts 
This thesis will provide future researchers with a platform to evaluate the current 
threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.  The thesis concludes that the United States is 
engaged in two separate conflicts.  Domestically, the U.S. is prepared for the domestic 
threat.  Internationally, the U.S. is engaged in a battle with a radical Islamic insurgency.  
The thesis provides a synthesis of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency theories as 
they relate to homeland security.   This thesis incorporates counterinsurgency theories 
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which, to date, have had limited discussion in the homeland security community.  The 
synthesis of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency will, hopefully, provide homeland 
security policymakers with a framework in which they can develop a counterterrorism 
strategy that will is appropriate to the current threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.      
3. Immediate Consumer  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide executive federal, state and local leaders 
with policy recommendations for protecting the United States.  These recommendations 
need to be based upon an accurate evaluation of the current threat posed by radical 
Islamic terrorists.  This threat evaluation will allow counterterrorism professionals to 
design an appropriate strategy to counteract that threat.  It is also designed to initiate a 
dialogue among homeland security professionals regarding the actual threat to the U.S. 
homeland posed by radical Islamic terrorists.  It is essential that the homeland security 
community acknowledge and address the practical application of our current strategies.  
This thesis will provide homeland security professionals with a proposal for dealing with 
the actual threat.  The recommendations brought forward in this thesis are based on a 
synthesis of the evidence utilized in the most prevalent criticisms of the current U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy.   
F. ROAD MAP  
Chapter II – A Clash of Civilizations  
Chapter II provides an overview of the current criticisms of the U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy that believe that the West is engaged in a clash of civilizations 
against Islam.  Specifically, it provides a dire warning for our failure to correctly identify 
the current threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.   
 Chapter III – An Exaggerated Threat  
Chapter III provides an overview of the current criticism of the U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy from those who believe the threat to the U.S. posed by radical 
Islamic terrorists has been exaggerated.  As a result of this exaggeration, the U.S. has 
overemphasized homeland security at the expense of other national priorities.    
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 Chapter IV – The Current National Strategy 
Chapter IV provides a synopsis of current U.S. counterterrorist strategies.  This 
summary provides a foundation on which to evaluate and build a more appropriate 
national counterterrorism strategy.   
 Chapter V – The Current Threat  
Chapter V builds upon previous chapters to provide an assessment of the current 
threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.   This chapter separates the threat into two 
categories: threat to the U.S. homeland by terrorists located in the U.S. and threats to the 
U.S. and its interests from radical Islamic terrorists located outside of the U.S.   
 Chapter VI – The True Conflict:  A Radical Islamic Insurgency   
Chapter VI redefines the threat as a radical Islamic insurgency.  The threat posed 
by this group originates from insurgents based outside of the U.S.  In order to meet this 
threat, the U.S. must develop an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy.  Domestically, 
the U.S. is not engaged in a counterinsurgency.  The domestic threat to the U.S. is made 
up of stereotypical terrorist operatives.  Since 9/11, the changes within the homeland 
security community have been successfully enhanced to meet this challenge.  As result, 
domestic U.S. counterterrorism operations should begin to focus on the utilization of 
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II. A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 
America is at war with terrorist enemies who are intent on attacking our 
Homeland and destroying our way of life1 
— President George W. Bush 
 
They will stop at nothing to destroy our way of life, and we, on the other 
hand, we stop at nothing to defend it2 
— Secretary Tom Ridge, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been engaged in a global 
War on Terror.  During a September 20, 2001, address to a joint session of Congress and 
the American people, President Bush declared, “Our War on Terror begins with al Qaeda, 
but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped and defeated.”3  Since that address, the U.S. has, unfortunately, 
failed to provide the necessary guidance and resources to support the identification and 
disruption of all globally active terrorist organizations.  Contrary to the rhetoric, the U.S. 
needs to recognize that the War on Terror is a generational struggle between civilizations.  
The U.S. needs to realign its national priorities to confront this overwhelming threat.  
Many supporters believe this should resemble or supersede our response to the Cold War.     
Ironically, this concept predates the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In 1990, one of 
the world’s leading experts on the Middle East, Bernard Lewis, wrote an article for the 
Atlantic Monthly titled, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.”4 In the article, Lewis outlined a 
                                                 
1 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC, October 
2007). 
2 United States Department of Homeland Security, Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Washington, DC, 2004) preface. 
3 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Washington DC, 
September 20, 2001) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [Accessed 
December 2, 2001.] 
4 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly (September 1990): 18.   
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basis for the developing Islamic threat.  Lewis described the Muslim view of the world as 
divided into two spheres: the “House of Islam” and the “House of Unbelief.”5   As 
Western influence in the Middle East grew; the Muslim world began to view 
Westernization as religious imperialism.  As a result, many Muslims began to transform 
nationalist movements into anti-Western movements.  Lewis described this development 
as a “Clash of Civilizations.”6  Lewis warned that the West must be cognizant of this 
developing threat.  In particular, the West must avoid involvement, or perceived 
involvement, in religious wars.7 
Unfortunately, the West did not pay heed to Bernard Lewis’s warnings.  After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. focused on the 
reduction and realignment of its military and intelligence structures.   In what has been 
described as the “peace dividend,” on January 28, 1992, in his State of the Union address, 
President George H. W. Bush proclaimed: 
Two years ago, I began planning cuts in military spending that reflected 
the changes of the new era. But now, this year, with imperial communism 
gone, that process can be accelerated. Tonight I can tell you of dramatic 
changes in our strategic nuclear force. These are actions we are taking on 
our own because they are the right thing to do. After completing 20 planes 
for which we have begun procurement, we will shut down further 
production of the B - 2 bombers. We will cancel the small ICBM program. 
We will cease production of new warheads for our sea-based ballistic 
missiles. We will stop all new production of the Peacekeeper missile. And 
we will not purchase any more advanced cruise missiles.8 
Although the reduction in these Cold War-era military systems was appropriate, 
President H. W. Bush acknowledged that the peace would not last forever when he said, 
 
 
                                                 
5 Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” 18.   
6 Ibid., 21–22. 
7 Ibid., 26. 
8 George H. W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Washington, DC,  January 28, 1992) http://www.c-
span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year=1992 (Accessed November 
12, 2007).  
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And though yesterday's challenges are behind us, tomorrow's are being 
born...By 1997, we will have cut defense by 30 percent since I took office. 
These cuts are deep, and you must know my resolve: This deep, and no 
deeper. To do less would be insensible to progress, but to do more would 
be ignorant of history. We must not go back to the days of "the hollow 
army." We cannot repeat the mistakes made twice in this century when 
armistice was followed by recklessness and defense was purged as if the 
world were permanently safe.9 
The significant reductions in defense spending, unfortunately, did not allow for 
the identification of the looming enemy, nor did it take into account the possibility of an 
enemy that did not resemble the U.S.S.R.  
With the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Congress recognized the need to evaluate the 
Intelligence Community’s mission and effectiveness.  In October 1994, Congress 
established an independent Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United 
States Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission on Intelligence).10 The 
Commission, chaired by Les Aspin, Harold Brown and Warren B. Rudman, issued its 
report, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, in 1996.  The 
report outlined significant deficiencies in the collection, analysis and management of 
intelligence across multiple agencies.  Many of these criticisms would, unfortunately, be 
echoed by several post-9/11 intelligence reviews.  In particular, the Aspin-Brown 
Commission determined that U.S. intelligence agencies appeared to be searching for, 
“reasons to justify their existence.”11  As a result, the Intelligence Community expanded 
its original targets to include counter-narcotics, economic espionage and environmental 
issues.  Many critics of the Intelligence Community began to question the very existence 
of these organizations.  At a minimum, the altered role of the intelligence agencies 
required a continued influx of significant financial support.  This became a controversial 
proposal.  At this point in time, many people in the U.S. were expecting a significant 
financial reduction in federal spending.  This reduction was often referred to as a peace 
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dividend.  Despite the peace dividend, the Intelligence Community demanded significant 
monetary support.  In comparison to the Defense Budget (minus intelligence spending), 
the overall Intelligence Budget had a significant increase since from 1980 to its projected 




Figure 1.   Intelligence Spending vs. Defense Spending since 1980 (from 13) 
 
Regardless of the U.S. Intelligence and Defense Community’s priorities, most 
agreed that the U.S. continued to face significant threats.  Many individuals inside and 
outside the government predicted the most significant threat would originate from the 
Middle East.  In the summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs journal, the concept of a Clash 
of Civilizations was expounded upon in the seminal article by Samuel P. Huntington in 
“The Clash of Civilizations?”  The article explored Huntington’s belief that an 
individual’s ethnicity significantly influences his or her political interactions.14 
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Due, in part, to an overwhelming response, Huntington expanded upon the 
concept of the Clash of Civilizations in his 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order.15  Huntington believed that an individual’s ethnicity 
determines their political interactions at a local level.16  In turn, these relationships define 
a country and ultimately a civilization.  As defined by Huntington, the most significant 
component of a civilization is an individual’s religion.  Most of the world’s civilizations 
are formed around the largest religions: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic and Orthodox.  
The remaining civilizations, Western, Latin American and possibly African, incorporate 
the religious values of some of the other civilizations.17   
Huntington argues that we have undergone two phases of civilization and are 
entering the third.  During the first phase, prior to 1500 A.D., which he called the 
“Encounter Phase,” most civilizations had limited contact with one another.  During the 
second “Impact Phase,” 84 percent of the world was suborned to the West.  Huntington 
argues that the “Rise of the West” was a result of violence, not ideas.  We are currently 
entering the third “Interactions Phase.”  This phase focuses on the end of Western 
expansionism and a revolt against Western ideas.18  During this phase, Huntington argues 
that the world’s civilizations have two choices, modernization and/or Westernization.  
Westernization involves the integration of Western ideals and values into a civilization.  
Modernization involves the acceptance of the technological advances.  Civilizations can 
reject both, or choose one without the other.19  Huntington believes most of the world has 
chosen to become, “more modern and less Western.”20   
In a quest to become more modern, many populations are being uprooted from 
their traditional environments.  Religion can “provide meaning and direction…(to) 
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modernizing societies.”21  This includes the Islamic civilization.   Huntington portrays 
the current Islamic resurgence as the equivalent of the Protestant Reformation.22  He 
states that Islam rejects modernization, not Westernization; however, radical Islamic 
fundamentalists reject both.23   Huntington cautions that religious opponents are far more 
difficult to deal with than secular opponents.  In all societies, religious opposition has 
inherent places of shelter in their places of worship and institutions.24    
On September 11, 2001, the seemingly academic debate over the relevance of a 
“Clash of Civilizations” came to an abrupt and deadly conclusion with the attacks on 
New York and the Pentagon.  In the aftermath of the attacks, the U.S. began to examine 
the cause and status of its new adversaries.  Many individuals found it hard to fathom that 
the U.S. was unaware and ill prepared to confront the threat of radical Islam.  To prepare 
itself for this new war, the U.S. instituted significant reforms in its defense, intelligence 
and homeland security programs.  Of note, the U.S. created the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National 
Counterterrorism Center, and underwent a transformation of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s mission from law enforcement to intelligence.  At the time, many 
observers believed these changes adequately prepared us for the “War on Terror.”  
Regrettably, they appear to have only illuminated our continued vulnerabilities.   
These institutional changes, while bureaucratically significant, have not altered 
our enemies’ framework or lessoned their desire to destroy us.  In The West’s Last 
Chance, Washington Times senior editor Tony Blankley argues that the West is engaged 
in a battle where the “threat is every bit as great…as was the threat of the Nazis taking 
over Europe in the 1940s.”25  Blankley argues that the threat is not limited to radical 
Islamic extremists, but includes all Muslims.26  Blankley writes that Islam dictates what 
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Muslims should say and do.  He believes these commandments are totally incompatible 
with the Western way of life.  Ultimately, these discrepancies will force Muslim’s to 
confront the Western societies in which they live.  Blankley believes that the Islamic 
Diaspora is becoming increasingly assertive in their religious and cultural beliefs.  In 
effect, they are engaged in an “Islamist insurgency” against the West. He feels we must 
“monitor and contain” this assertiveness.27  Blankley writes, “They are ahead of us, 
behind us and within us.”28  As a result of this hidden enemy, Blankley believes our 
current policies are inadequate to counter the threat.   
To confront the threat, Blankley argues that the U.S. should obtain congressional 
authority to declare war against radical Islam; though he says even this might not be 
enough. 29  Blankley argues the U.S. may need to seek Constitutional Amendments to in 
order to provide the government with the necessary authorities to confront this threat.30  
Blankley outlines some of the United States’ historically controversial wartime uses of 
power.  Specifically, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, 
sedition, restriction of free speech, internal propaganda, and censorship may ultimately be 
necessary to confront this threat.31  Regardless of our decisions, Blankley believes 
disengagement or negotiation is not an option.  We need to fight or be assimilated into a 
worldwide Islamic Caliphate.    
In 2004, in an attempt to illustrate our continued vulnerabilities, Michael Scheuer, 
the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Agency’s Usama Bin 
Ladin unit (Alex Station), published Imperial Hubris.32  Imperial Hubris offered a 
critical assessment of the current U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  It offered robust 
solutions needed to defeat radical Islam. 
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Scheuer argues that al Qaeda is not a terrorist group, but a worldwide insurgent 
organization.33  This significant difference, in Scheurer’s opinion, implies a greater threat 
to the Western world.  While terrorism is incapable of defeating the U.S., Scheuer 
illustrates that no country can consider itself immune from a well-organized internal 
insurgency.  In Imperial Hubris, Scheuer provides a concise look at al Qaeda’s stated and 
implied goals and objectives: 
1. End U.S. aid to Israel, with the ultimate destruction of Israel;  
2. Remove U.S. forces from the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Afghanistan and all 
Muslim Nations;  
3. End U.S. support for oppressive regimes in Russia, China and India;  
4. End apostate Muslim regimes; and  
5. Conserve oil in order to raise oil prices.34   
 
Contrary to repeated statement by U.S. government leaders, Scheuer documented 
that al Qaeda’s goals are not a reaction to Western values, but are a result of U.S. 
policies.35    In order to accomplish its goals, al Qaeda focused on developing and 
training its members and associates.  The goal of this training was to create an army of 
insurgent fighters, not terrorists.  These fighters would be used for direct action against al 
Qaeda’s enemies, but they would also serve as the al Qaeda worldwide network.36   This 
cadre would be used to develop and train fighters who were sympathetic to al Qaeda's 
goals and objectives.  Contrary to the popular belief, terrorism was not the main focus of 
this training.  The training primarily focused on the development of insurgent fighters.37   
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In response to the perceived threat, the U.S. has developed a policy of limited 
engagement that relies on cooperation between the law enforcement, the military and 
intelligence agencies.38  Scheuer argues that this is ultimately a failed strategy.  The 
underlying factor surrounding the U.S. failed counterterrorism policy is our inability to 
view al Qaeda as an insurgent organization and not a terrorist group.39   This is a key 
deficiency in our ability to successfully defeat radical Islamic terrorist.  From 2001 to 
2004, Scheuer credits the FBI’s disruption of the “Lackawanna Six” as the only domestic 
U.S. victory.40 Conversely, he outlines seventy-three worldwide al Qaeda victories.41    
Since then, there have been U.S. arrests in connection to terrorist plots that targeted Fort 
Dix, New Jersey, and the Sears Tower in Chicago, Illinois.42  Internationally, the al 
Qaeda has conducted successful attacks in Madrid, London and Saudi Arabia.43 
Scheuer is particularly critical of the domestic U.S. counterterrorism strategy.   He 
outlines the current policy as one of full cooperation between law enforcement and 
intelligence.  Scheuer viciously describes this arrangement as “moral cowardness,”44  
saying he believes the cooperation has “dulled” the capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).45  Furthermore, he argues 
that our “law enforcement mentality” has infected our counterterrorism operations and 
prevented the U.S. military from killing our adversaries.46  Scheuer adds that the fixation 
with maintaining a law enforcement component to the War on Terror has weakened our 
                                                 
38 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United 
States, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 2005. 3–7. 
39 Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, 61. 
40 Ibid., 87.  
41Ibid., 91.  
42 Christine Hauser and Anahad O’Conner, “6 Arrested in Plot to Attack Fort Dix.”  The New York 
Times, (May 8, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/us/08cnd-
dix.html?ex=1336276800&en=85a2795016f8037f&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss [Accessed February 
2, 2008].  
43 MSNBC, “Al-Qaeda Timeline:  Attacks and plots”  MSNBC Website, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4677978/ [Accessed February 2, 2008]. 
44 Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, 190.   
45 Ibid., 187.   
46 Ibid., 186.   
 20
enemies’ perception of U.S. resolve.47  This has had significant overseas repercussions.  
Overall, he argues, our focus on the rule of law has significantly hampered our ability to 
destroy al Qaeda and its affiliates.  Scheurer holds particular disdain for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) involvement in overseas counterterrorist operations.48  
He believes that the FBI’s involvement in overseas intelligence operations is 
inappropriate against the threat of radical Islam.  The FBI, as a law enforcement entity 
within the Department of Justice, is required to follow the rule of law.49   In evaluating 
our current counterterrorism posture, Scheurer criticizes the foundations of the U.S. 
strategy.  He believes that al Qaeda is a military enemy, not a criminal organization.  As 
such, the military should play a key role, not law enforcement.  The use of a law 
enforcement agency, he believes, sends the wrong message to our enemies and allies.   
In identifying U.S. vulnerabilities to an al Qaeda threat, Scheurer argues that al 
Qaeda’s main target is the U.S. economy.  Scheuer believes this as our “center of 
gravity.”50  In this, Scheurer believes that al Qaeda has been extremely successful.51  We 
appear to be draining our economy in an effort to confront all possible threats.  This is 
evident in the current policy of responding to all threats.  This policy weakens the U.S. 
while it strengthens al Qaeda.  It allows al Qaeda to manipulate U.S. government actions 
without having to actually engage in a terrorist attack.  He believes “frantic activity, 
ceaseless chatter and loud voices usually signal confusion.”52  This visibly describes 
current U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  Since the attacks on 9/11, the U.S. has undergone 
a continual re-engineering of its counterterrorism apparatus.  From the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security to the development of Fusion Centers, the U.S. has 
continually strived to design and implement the apparatus that will defeat the continually 
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changing terrorist threat.   In its first year in existence, DHS issued over thirteen warnings 
to the homeland security community on the potential terrorist use of:  ferryboats, rental 
vehicles, hydrogen peroxide, helicopters, storage facility’s, uniforms and trains.53  The 
continued restructuring and alarmist warnings provide an unstable foundation in which to 
confront our enemies.   
To succeed, Schuerer believes we must fight an all-out war.  This war will involve 
the killing and destruction of al Qaeda and its entire supporting terrorist infrastructure.54    
Scheurer believes this goal should guide our country’s counterterrorist response.  He 
believes our current policies are focused on a limited engagement strategy that relies on 
military, intelligence and law enforcement entities.  Scheuer believes this tri-lateral 
organizational system will lead us into defeat because the focus on the rule of law limits 
the U.S. ability to destroy al Qaeda and its affiliates.  In a war, we use solders, not police 
officers.  The use of law enforcement in this war has a limiting effect on the tools and 
resources the U.S. will bring to the fight.  Police agencies must be relegated to their 
clearly defined role — protection of the citizenry, not war fighting.   
Scheurer argues that the U.S. has not established a means to measure the success 
of its counterterrorism strategy.  The absence of an accurate metric will continue to 
diminish our ability to design and implement an effective response to the radical Islamist 
threat.55  Our inability to identify the threat, develop a clear strategy and implement 
suitable tactics by appropriate agencies will continue to cripple our ability to defeat 
radical Islamic terrorists.   
In April of 2007, in response to increasing critiques of the U.S. “War on Terror ” 
strategy, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff wrote on Op-ed for the 
Washington Post titled “Make No Mistake:  This Is War.”56  In his editorial, Chertoff 
wrote that we are “at war with a global movement and ideology whose members seek to 
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advance totalitarian aims through terrorism.”  Chertoff believes that the U.S. must 
recognize that the current threat is comparable to “historical totalitarian ideologies.”   
Chertoff points to Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda’s statements in which they declare war 
on the United States.  He believes the war, which was created by “fanatical Islamist 
ideologues,” can be evaluated by their “intent, capability and consequence.”57 Chertoff 
writes that radical Islamists have started a war to dominate all countries.  He argues that 
radical Islamists do not differentiate between the military and civilians in this war.  He 
reasons that they intend to cause a massive loss of life as the attempt to disrupt our, 
“international system of travel and trade.”58  He admits that they may not have the ability 
to accomplish this goal; however, they do have the ability to gain territory in which they 
“can train, assemble advanced inhumane weaponry; impose their own vision of 
repressive law; and dominate local life.”59  If successful by these limited measures, 
Chertoff believes they maybe able to establish radical “statelets” in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East.60  In examining the potential consequences of this war, Chertoff points out 
that al Qaeda was able to attack the U.S. with the “most devastating single blow ever 
visited upon our homeland by a foreign enemy.”  According to Chertoff, this attack 
demonstrated that Islamic terrorists have the intent and capabilities that are 
commensurate with war.  Chertoff cites, “threat assessments and other evidence of a 
militarized and networked foe.”   In conclusion, he argues, “complacency is a dangerous 
indulgence in the face of a determined enemy.” 
In July 2007, the National Intelligence Council issued an unclassified National 
Intelligence Estimate titled, “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland.”61  A National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the “Intelligence Community’s most authoritative written 
judgments on national security issues and designed to help U.S. civilian and military 
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leaders develop policies to protect U.S. national security interests.”62  The NIE advised 
that the U.S. would face a “persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three 
years.”  The main threat to the U.S. would be from Islamic terrorists, especially al Qaeda.  
The NIE assesses that “al Qaeda has protected or regenerated key elements of its 
homeland attack capabilities.”  The NIE argues that al Qaeda will “intensify” its efforts to 
bring its operatives into the U.S.  According to the report, al Qaeda will continue to focus 
its attack planning on “prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets.”63  The 
goal of these attacks will be to provide innovative, “visually dramatic” destruction, inflict 
mass casualties and cause significant economic aftershocks.  The NIE noted that al Qaeda 
continues to express a desire to obtain and utilize weapons of mass destruction.64   
The NIE points to several factors that contribute to al Qaeda’s regenerated ability 
to attack the U.S. Homeland.  First, al Qaeda increased its cooperation with regional 
terrorist groups.  In particular, al Qaeda intends to leverage its affiliate, al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI).  AQI is the only affiliate that has expressed a desire to attack the U.S. homeland.  
Al Qaeda hopes that AQI will energize the larger Sunni extremist community.65 
The NIE also addressed other radical Islamic terrorist organizations that are not 
directly affiliated with al Qaeda and its associates.  In particular, the NIE warns about the 
growing threat from radical, self-generating cells in Western Europe and the U.S. The 
NIE believes this possibility is not as significant in the U.S. as it is in Europe.66   
The NIE believes globalization will challenge current U.S. defensive efforts to 
confront terrorism.  They suggest the U.S. institute a greater understanding of suspect 
activities at the local level in relation to the strategic threat picture.67 
The NIE reinforces the need to develop and expanded strategy to thwart the 
growing threat.  The NIE assessment indicates that our current strategy has been 
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ineffective in confronting the threat from radical Islamic terrorists.  To meet the threat, 
the U.S. needs to expand counterterrorism strategy to include all capabilities of our 
government.    
Since 9/11, the U.S. and our allies have identified a new participant in this War on 
Terror.  This new element is commonly referred to as “homegrown” terrorists.  
Homegrown terrorists are individuals who are citizens or residents of the countries they 
attack.  The potential threats posed by homegrown terrorists have become increasingly 
evident by the successful attacks in Madrid, Casablanca and London.  Thankfully, 
various governments were able to disrupt several similar plots in Toronto, Australia and 
Amsterdam.68 The individuals responsible for the successful and thwarted attacks were 
citizens or residents of the targeted countries.  Instead of looking outward, 
counterterrorism officials were forced to look inward for potential terrorist operators.    
Many counterterrorist officials became extremely concerned about the absence of 
a clear link between these terrorists and al Qaeda, and recognized the significance of this 
shift. 69   Instead of focusing on direct connections to al Qaeda and other radical Islamic 
terrorist organizations, they must now focus on citizens and residents who may be 
influenced by al Qaeda-inspired ideology.  If allowed to continue, this process could have 
a significant effect on the security of our nation.  Because these individuals may not have 
direct connections to existing terrorist organizations, U.S. counterterrorism officials were 
forced to re-evaluate their domestic counterterrorism strategy.   
Counterterrorism officials are examining the process by which “normal” 
individuals were transformed into radical Islamic extremists.  This process is known as 
radicalization. The Department of Homeland Security defines radicalization as “the 
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process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support 
or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”70    
In a March 14, 2007, appearance before the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security, Michael Chertoff reiterated the potential threat posed by homegrown terrorists.  
To confront this threat, Chertoff identified radicalization as a key area in the development 
of all terrorists — homegrown or international.  Chertoff argued, “When we understand 
the process that leads a person to support and/or pursue violence, we will be in the best 
position to protect our country from the widest possible range of threats we face.”71  In an 
effort to prevent the development of these terrorists, Chertoff discussed the importance of 
identifying the radicalization process to that we are better prepared to counteract the 
process.72   
In August 2007, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) issued a report 
titled, Radicalization in the West:  The Homegrown Threat.  The report echoed concern 
over the increased instances of “unremarkable” individuals who attack the country in 
which they reside. 73  The NYPD report compared the terrorist operators of several 
terrorist plots and attacks in London, Madrid, Toronto, Amsterdam and Australia, which 
were conducted or developed by residents of the countries that were targeted or attacked.  
These terrorists were compared to terrorists who were successfully apprehended in the 
U.S.  The U.S. “homegrown” terrorists were involved in the Lackawanna Six, Portland 
Seven, the Northern Virginia Jihad, the New York Herald Square Subway plot and the 
New York Al Muhajroun Two.74  In all of these plots and attacks, the perpetrators were 
thought to be individuals who were citizens of, or resided in, the countries that were 
targeted.   The NYPD report identified four phases of radicalization: pre-radicalization, 
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self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization.75  The first two, possibly three, phases 
involve actions that are not criminal in nature.  The last phase, jihadization, involves the 
individual’s desire to commit a terrorist attack, combined with active operational 
planning.  
The NYPD report documents the existence of a “homegrown” threat in the U.S.  
The report argues that it is imperative that the U.S. develop a mechanism to identify and 
disrupt the radicalization process.   The U.S. must acknowledge that individuals are most 
vulnerable prior to committing to terrorist planning.  It is clear that the U.S. has not 
prepared itself against the worldwide radical Islamist insurgency.   Our current strategy is 
one of limited engagement that selectively targets a small percentage of our enemies.  To 
alter our continued vulnerability, the U.S. must devise a strategy that will support the 
homeland while engaging the entire spectrum of radical Islamists.   
As this chapter illustrates, many believe the U.S. is engaged in a clash of 
civilizations between the West and Islam.  If true, the U.S. has not adequately prepared 
itself for this conflict.  As a result, the U.S. will continue to engage in tactics that 
strengthen our enemies at the same time we remain vulnerable to the current threat.  
Conversely, what are the alternatives to a clash of civilizations?  Many individuals 
believe we are not engaged in a clash of civilizations.  In fact, significant groups of critics 
believe that the threat has been overstated.  These critics argue that that our current U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy has led to the formation of an unneeded domestic 
counterterrorism infrastructure.   The next chapter will examine the assumptions of these 
critics.   
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III. EXAGGERATED THREAT  
Despite all the ominous warnings of wily terrorists and imminent attacks, 
there has been neither a successful strike nor a close call in the United 
States since 9/11.  The reasonable—but rarely heard—explanation is that 
there are no terrorists within the United States, and few have the means or 
inclination to strike from abroad. 
— John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?”76 
 
Americans are not in charge of the War on Terror; the War on Terror is in 
charge of us. 
— Ian Lustick, “Trapped in the War on Terror”77 
 
 
In contrast to many critics’ views that the U.S. is unprepared for the 
overwhelming threat posed by the clash between the West and radical Islam, many others 
believe the actual threat has been exaggerated.  Recently, many question why the U.S. 
has devoted so much time, energy and money into its War on Terror.  All agree that the 
attacks on 9/11 had a devastating and significant impact on the mental and physical well-
being of our citizenry; however, many are beginning to question the necessity and 
legitimacy of the U.S. response.  To address our current counterterrorism strategy, we 
must examine the accepted premise that there is a threat of a significant and catastrophic 
terrorist attack in the U.S.  
Regardless of the threat, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy has resulted in 
numerous changes within defense, intelligence and homeland security communities.78    
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On the federal level, it created a new cabinet-level component, the Department of 
Homeland Security, a new intelligence overseer, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and reformulated the mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 
law enforcement to intelligence.79 Not to be outdone, state and local officials created over 
forty-eight intelligence Fusion Centers.  These Fusion Centers were designed to augment 
a perceived lack of integration between federal and state/local authorities.  The changes 
have resulted in the movement of thousands of federal, state, local and tribal law 
enforcement officers from law enforcement to counterterrorism and intelligence 
activities.80     
The most powerful argument in support of an exaggerated threat theory is that we 
have not had a significant terrorist attack since 9/11.81   This alone should encourage 
individuals to question the validity of our response; however, in 2005, the Department of 
State reported that there were only fifty-six U.S. citizens killed and seventeen injured as a 
result of terrorism.82   In contrast, as of February 2, 2008, the Department of Defense 
reports 4,420 U.S. military personnel killed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 
Enduring Freedom.83  In terms of lives lost, our response to terrorism appears to increase 
the likelihood of American deaths, as opposed to the terrorists’ ability to accomplish this 
on their own.   
Our overseas counterterrorism operations were designed to attack the terrorists 
before they could enter the U.S.; however, since 9/11, the U.S. has been unable to 
identify a direct al Qaeda plot within the U.S.  In 2005, the Washington Post conducted a 
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study indicating that of the two-hundred terrorism-related prosecutions conducted by the 
U.S. Department of Justice only thirty-nine individuals were convicted of terrorism-
related offenses. Of these thirty-nine prosecutions, only fourteen were directly related to 
al Qaeda. 84   
A more recent study, conducted by the Center on Law and Security at New York 
University School of Law, examined federal criminal indictments between September 11, 
2001, and September 11, 2006.  The study identified 510 terrorism-related cases.  Of 
these cases, only 163 were indicted on terrorism-related charges.  Of the 163 indictments, 
only four were convicted of terrorism-related charges.85  It is interesting to note that none 
of the individuals identified in the study had any logistical or tactical links to al Qaeda.  
Despite this absence of terrorist operators within the U.S., President George W. Bush and 
other homeland security leaders continue to call for increased vigilance and resources to 
confront terrorism.  
The absence of attacks and terrorists in the U.S. since 9/11 has been explained by 
four factors:  
1. The changes in our counterterrorism, intelligence and homeland security 
agencies; 
2. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have prevented terrorists from attacking 
the U.S.; and 86  
3. The terrorists do not have the capability and/or intent to attack the U.S.; or  
4. The terrorists are focused on a catastrophic attack.   
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As noted earlier, the U.S. has drastically altered the purpose, management and 
mission of our law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies.  These changes 
resulted in the expansion of our intelligence program and the formation of the largest 
department within the U.S. government.  After the attacks on 9/11, the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (USIC) came under tremendous criticism for its inability to protect the U.S. 
homeland.  As an immediate solution, President George W. Bush announced the creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in June 2002.87   
In a further attempt to revitalize the USIC, the president and Congress established 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 
Commission) and the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission).88  These Commissions 
outlined several deficiencies within the U.S. Intelligence Community.89  These 
deficiencies included a lack of communication, integration and clear organizational 
leadership.   
In an attempt to correct these deficiencies, Congress enacted the Intelligence 
Reform and Prevention Act of 2004.90  The Act was intended “to reform the intelligence 
community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government.”91  The Act established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center to provide leadership, access and 
coordination for the components of the USIC. 92  These changes were a step in the right 
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direction; however, they have not provided a clear process for the integration of federal, 
state, local and tribal agencies into the national intelligence strategy. 93     
Even though we have expanded these organizations, these agencies are unable to 
protect our citizenry from significant criminal activity (i.e., bombings, shootings and 
sniper attacks).   The only difference between these criminal acts and terrorism is the 
perpetrator’s intent. Absence a terrorist’s intent, many of these types of attacks could 
have been categorized as terrorist attacks.94  The most recent data indicate that in 2003, 
there were 386 bombings or attempted bombings in the U.S. 95   In 2006, more than 
10,000 individuals were murdered with a firearm.96  These statistics illustrate law 
enforcement’s inability to prevent violent crime regardless of the intent of the 
perpetrators.  This is not a deficiency; it is a fact of life.  Questions remain as to why 
terrorists have chosen not to utilize these tactics in the U.S.   
It is not a matter of access.  The U.S. does not domestically manufacture cocaine; 
however, in 2006, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized over 68,926 
kilograms of cocaine.97  In comparison, the U.S. Coast Guard seized over 161,367 
kilograms of cocaine in 2007.98  Obviously, there continues to be an illegal mechanism to 
move illegal substances into the U.S.     
If we are to believe the threat is as severe as the president and the intelligence 
community says, we must conversely believe that our homeland security agencies have 
been 100 percent successful in the prevention and/or disruption of all terrorist plots to 
attack the U.S.  Several critics, however, point to the fallacy that the U.S. government is 
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capable of providing this level of protection.99  As noted earlier, a review of the 
government’s response to other wars, the “war on drugs,” indicates that the U.S. is unable 
to provide 100 percent relief and protection.   
Further examples of the deficiencies in our homeland security agencies are, 
unfortunately, easy to come by.  Immigration enforcement has seen significant 
improvement in the aftermath of 9/11; however, we continue to allow over ten million 
illegal immigrants to reside in the U.S.100    Among these illegal immigrants, a significant 
number, “perhaps thousands,” are Muslim.101   
An examination of the facts makes several things clear.  First, the U.S. is unable 
to prevent motivated individuals from entering the U.S. legally or illegally.102  Second, 
our homeland security agencies are unable to prevent a significant amount of violence 
directed at its citizens.103  Except for motivation, many of these violent acts would be 
identical to terrorist acts.  Lastly, the U.S. law enforcement community has apparently 
not arrested or disrupted a significant terrorist plot within the U.S.104  The combination of 
these facts would indicate that terrorists have chosen not to attack the U.S. or they do not 
exist.  Several critics, including John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State 
University, conclude that if terrorists are as “dedicated, diabolical and competent” as we 
are lead to believe, our counterterrorist actions would not have prevented them from 
conducting an attack.105  The only rational conclusion is that they are not in the U.S.    
Regardless of terrorist’s intent or ability to conduct an attack in the U.S., a second 
rationalization for the lack of another terrorist attack is the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Since the development of the “War on Terror,” it has been the administration’s intent to 
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identify, disrupt and neutralize terrorists before they enter the U.S.  The most significant 
examples of this mission are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Most people will agree 
that a crucial step toward destroying a terrorist organization is the removal of its physical 
infrastructure and support mechanisms.  After the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. quickly 
identified Afghanistan as the key staging area for al Qaeda.  In November 2001, the U.S. 
and its allies invaded Afghanistan and successfully removed al Qaeda and their Taliban 
sponsors.  After this “victory,” President Bush shifted the focus of the War on Terror to 
Iraq.  Many would argue the justifications that led up to the Iraq war; however, it is clear 
that our military forces are engaged in daily, direct combat with al Qaeda and their 
supporters.  Since the invasion of Iraq, President Bush has repeatedly stated that the Iraq 
war is the “central front in our War on Terror.”106   
Despite our military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, al Qaeda and its supporters 
continue to operate outside of these areas.  Since the invasions, al Qaeda and their proxies 
have conducted successful attacks in the United Kingdom, Spain, Egypt, Jordon, Saudi 
Arabia, Morocco and Denmark.107  Many of these and other Western European countries 
have reported the disruption of significant terrorist operational attack planning cells.108   
Prior to her retirement in November 2006, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the 
British Security Service (MI-5), announced in a rare public speech that,  
today, my officers and the police are working to contend with some 200 
groupings or networks, totaling over 1,600 identified individuals (and 
there will be many we don't know) who are actively engaged in plotting, 
or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas.109   
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The specificity of the actual numbers of potential terrorist operators in the U.K. is 
in sharp contrast to the statements made by homeland security leaders in the U.S.    
The War on Terror has been described as a battle to “disrupt and end a way of 
life.”110  John Mueller takes umbrage with the U.S. government’s professed belief that 
radical Islamic terrorists are capable of destroying our way of life.  He illustrates this by 
explaining that even if a 9/11-scale attack occurs every three months for the next five 
years, it will result in the deaths of only .02 percent of the U.S. population.111  Even with 
an atomic weapon, terrorists do not have the capacity to end our way of life.  The only 
mechanism available to them is their belief that our responses will accomplish their goals.  
The belief that they are waiting for a catastrophic attack is absurd.  In December 
2001, Richard Reid was arrested in Boston after he attempted to detonate a bomb while 
flying on an American Airlines flight from Paris, France.  The bomb had been embedded 
in his shoe.112  In a statement made during his sentencing to life in prison, Reid stated 
that he supported Usama bin Laden and was at war with the U.S.113    
In August 2006, the United Kingdom disrupted an al Qaeda plot to blow up 
several airplanes as they flew over U.S. and U.K. cities.114  The plot was, thankfully, 
disrupted by U.K. and U.S. authorities.   These events clearly indicate that al Qaeda is 
intent on utilizing any means necessary, large or small, to attack the U.S.  Since 9/11, 
Usama bin Laden and his al Qaeda associates have threatened the U.S.   There does not 
appear to be any indication that he and his associates are not doing everything possible to 
attack the U.S. homeland.   
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The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. 
Homeland,” advised that the U.S. would face a “persistent and evolving terrorist threat 
over the next three years.”115  A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the, “Intelligence 
Communities most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and 
designed to help U.S. civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect U.S. 
national security interests.”116  The NIE reports that worldwide counterterrorist 
operations have “constrained” al Qaeda’s ability to attack the U.S. homeland.  This 
supports the belief that the most effective utilization of our counterterrorism resources 
should be focused overseas; however, these groups perceive that it is more difficult to 
attack the U.S. than it was before the attacks on 9/11.117  Further confirmation can be 
found in the October 2006 White House list of the ten most significant plots disrupted by 
the U.S.  Of the ten plots listed, only three were directed against the U.S. homeland.118   
Unfortunately, the NIE assesses that, “al Qaeda has protected or regenerated key 
elements of its homeland attack capabilities.”  The NIE argues that al Qaeda will 
“intensify” its efforts to bring its operatives into the U.S. Al Qaeda will continue to focus 
its attack planning on “prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets.”119  The 
goal of these attacks will be to provide innovative, “visually dramatic” destruction, inflict 
mass casualties and to cause significant economic aftershocks.  Al Qaeda continues to 
express a desire to obtain and utilize weapons of mass destruction.  To date, the U.S. has 
discovered “handfuls” of individuals in the U.S. who have had ties to senior al Qaeda 
leadership since 9/11.120   
The NIE points to several factors that contribute to al Qaeda’s regenerated ability 
to attack the U.S. homeland.  First, al Qaeda increased its cooperation with “regional” 
                                                 
115 National Intelligence Council, “National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. 
Homeland” (Washington, DC, July 2007).  
116 Ibid., Preface. 
117 Ibid., 5.  
118 The White House, Fact Sheet:  Plots, Casings and Infiltrations Referenced in President Bush’s 
Remarks on the War on Terror (The White House, Washington, DC, October 6, 2006) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-7.html [Accessed February 6, 2005].  
119 National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland. 5.  
120 Ibid.  
 36
terrorist groups.  In particular, al Qaeda intends to “leverage” its affiliate, al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI).  AQI is the only affiliate that has expressed a desire to attack the U.S. homeland.  
Al Qaeda hopes that AQI will “energize” the larger Sunni extremist community.121 
The NIE also addresses other radical Islamic terrorist organizations that are not 
directly affiliated with al Qaeda and its associates.  In particular, the NIE warns about 
growing threats from “radical, self-generating cells” in Western Europe and the U.S. 
Fortunately, the NIE believes this possibility is not as significant in the U.S. as it is in 
Europe.122   
The NIE believes globalization will “challenge” current U.S. defensive efforts to 
confront terrorism.  They suggest the U.S. institute a “greater understanding” of suspect 
activities at the local level in relation to the strategic threat picture.123 
Despite of the rhetoric that surrounds the War on Terror, an examination of the 
facts leads one to believe that radical Islamic terrorists are not capable of attacking inside 
the U.S., or they have decided not to attack. 124 
One could argue that, regardless of the reasons, our current counterterrorism 
strategy has not contributed or allowed the terrorists to conduct further attacks.  This 
rationale, however, belays the true power of the terrorists.  Most counterterrorism experts 
will argue that terrorist power is not in the capacity to conduct attacks but in the ability to 
manipulate the government’s response to attacks.125  In this capacity, al Qaeda and 
radical Islamic terrorists have been most successful. Our response to terrorism, 
unfortunately, has negatively affected several areas of our society: legal, economic and 
diplomatic. 
The economic effect of the War on Terror is, obviously, the easiest to quantify.  
Since its inception, the War on Terror has caused a rapid expansion within numerous 
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areas of the federal government.  As of 2005, the U.S. spends 16 percent of its 
discretionary spending on the War on Terror.  To put this into context, it is 80 percent 
higher than federal expenditures on education. 126  Furthermore, it is estimated that the 
U.S. will spend approximately $2 trillion on the Iraq War.127  This is supplemented 
domestically by $17 billion in grants to state and local homeland security programs.128  
With continued instability in the U.S. economy and the threat of a looming recession, one 
could argue that our fight is not “worth” the cost. 
Next, the War on Terror it is diverting and distorting the social relationship 
(contract) between our citizens and the law enforcement, military and intelligence 
communities.  As previously noted, the attacks of 9/11, caused the U.S. to examine and 
ultimately change the structure of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The U.S. created 
new agencies and significantly altered the mission of others.  Since 9/11, all levels of our 
government have been encouraged and rewarded for the transformation of homeland 
security-focused law enforcement and intelligence.  This is most visible in the 
transformation of the FBI from the worldwide premier law enforcement agency to a quasi 
U.S. domestic security service.   
These changes are enhanced by the creation of more than thirty-eight state and 
local fusion centers.129  These centers were established by state governments to address 
the perceived lack of intelligence information sharing they were achieving within the 
state and between the state and federal governments.  Since their inception, these fusion 
centers have been embraced and sought out by both the FBI and the DHS.  As a result, 
the FBI has representation in all fusion centers while the DHS continues to expand its 
involvement through grants and personnel.   
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These changes, unfortunately, appear to have had a negative impact on 
nationwide levels of violent crime.  Reversing the double-digit decrease over the past ten 
years, the FBI’s 2006 Uniform Crime Report indicated that violent crime rose 1.9 
percent.130    
Post-9/11, all domestic law enforcement and homeland security agencies are 
focused on the identification, disruption and neutralization of terrorists.  This focus, 
regrettably, develops and fosters deep misunderstanding and concern within the 
homeland security community.   In their quest for intelligence, agencies have begun to 
question the lack of information they receive from one another.  Many agencies view this 
lack of information as a continuation of the mistrust between federal agencies and their 
state and local partners.  The reality appears to be much different, and arguably, more 
troublesome.  These agencies do not receive the information because the information 
does not exist.  
Unfortunately, this runs counter to the premise of the War on Terror.  In this war, 
the absence of evidence is believed to be evidence of our inability to locate the 
terrorists.131   As a result, more time, money and effort are put into information-sharing 
programs and the development and expansion of domestic intelligence-collection 
operations.  This expansion encourages our government to view all potential threats 
equally.  Anything and everything is a potential threat.132  In essence, Ian Lustick, a 
political science professor at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that, “Americans are 
not in charge of the War on Terror; the War on Terror is in charge of us.”133  
Mueller believes that the probability of attack is so low that our monetary 
expenditures are wasted on prevention.134  The homeland security establishment has 
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established the precedent that we must predict, prevent and deter all conceivable 
vulnerabilities.135   Under that definition, we are destined for failure.  In order to win this 
struggle, we must place it into context.  There is nothing a terrorist can do, including 
detonating a nuclear weapon, that will entirely destroy the U.S.  The only thing capable 
of doing that is us.  It is imperative that our leaders place the threat in the proper 
perspective.  Once we accomplish this, we will be able to provide an effective defense 
and response against the threat. 
Lastly, many critics are concerned about the continued stress that the ongoing 
War on Terror places upon our citizenry.  This criticism gained increased public 
awareness in a recent Op Ed article written by former U.S. National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski.  In the article, Brzezinski writes that the “War on Terror” has 
created a “culture of fear” in America.136  This fear “obscures reason (and) intensifies 
emotion.”  As a result, our government has been able to manipulate the public to accept 
their goals and objectives.  This fear has been reinforced by “terror entrepreneurs” who 
need to perpetuate fear to justify their existence.  Brzezinski argues that our actions, as a 
result of the “War on Terror,” have seriously eroded our core values and damaged U.S. 
prestige internationally.  Brzezinki states that we have not been shown any “hard 
evidence” that our counterterrorism actions have prevented a significant act of 
terrorism.137 
As stated earlier, the U.S. has been unable to identify al Qaeda sleeper cells 
within the U.S.  This has, unfortunately, resulted in the expansion of its definition of 
potential terrorists.  In its quest to locate these terrorists, the U.S. has begun to examine 
“homegrown” terrorists.  The expanded threat was a direct result of the successful attacks 
in Madrid, Casablanca and London.  Thankfully, various governments were able to 
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disrupt several similar plots in Toronto, Australia and Amsterdam.138 In these instances, 
the terrorists were citizens or residents of the targeted countries.  These “homegrown” 
terrorists appeared to have no direct connection to al Qaeda or other international terrorist 
organizations.  This caused significant concern within the U.S. counterterrorism 
community. 139  U.S. counterterrorism officials perceived a significant shift in the threat 
posed by radical Islamic extremists.  This shift resulted in a significant modification in 
domestic U.S. counterterrorism operations.  U.S. counterterrorism and government 
officials expanded their targeting of internal U.S. citizens and residents who had been 
influenced and inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology.   
Many in the Intelligence Community believe that homegrown terrorists may be 
the most significant threat to our homeland’s security.  As a result, U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts are focusing on the development of these “potential” terrorists.  The U.S. began to 
examine the process by which “normal” individuals were transformed into radical Islamic 
extremists.140  This process is called radicalization.  DHS defines radicalization as, “the 
process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, 
or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”141    
In confronting radicalization, the U.S. has, once again, assimilated Europe’s 
threats as our own.  An examination of the threat clearly indicates that, for several 
reasons, Europe is far more vulnerable to the threat of “homegrown” terrorism.142  This is 
a result of several factors including geography, socio-economic status and the 
disaffection of Muslim youth.143  These factors, thankfully, do not appear to be 
applicable to Muslims in America.  In a landmark survey, the Pew Research Center for 
                                                 
138 Michael D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New 
York City Police Department New York, August 15, 2007) 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/intel/nps37-110107-
01.pdf&code=c652f57a750279b26159c07bb6989fd6   [Accessed December 5, 2007] 5. 
139 Ibid., 5.  
140 Allen, Written Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs.  
141 Ibid., 4.  
142 Ibid., 2.  
143 Ibid., 2.  
 41
the People and the Press conducted a survey into Muslims in America. 144   The survey 
indicated that Muslim Americans are “largely assimilated, happy with their lives, and 
moderate with respect to many of the issues that have divided Muslims and Westerners 
around the world.”145   
Despite these statistics, the U.S. homeland security community continues to call 
for an examination of radicalization in the U.S.  Department of Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff identified radicalization as a key area in the development of 
all terrorists, homegrown or international.  In an effort to prevent the development of 
these terrorists, Secretary Chertoff discussed the importance of identifying the 
radicalization process so that we are better prepared to counteract the process.146 He 
stated, “When we understand the process that leads a person to support and/or pursue 
violence, we will be in the best position to protect our country from the widest possible 
range of threats we face.”147    While noble, this goal is unattainable.  The U.S. and the 
world in general are unable to identify what motivates an individual to support or pursue 
violence.  Like criminal activity in general, an individual’s motivation is a unique as the 
crimes they commit.  In fact, studies conducted by DHS document the varied causes of 
radicalization.  These studies found that radicalization “varies across ideological and 
ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic 
conditions.”148  Furthermore, it occurs through an assortment of human and institutional 
“catalysts.”149  
Despite these nebulous precursors, several homeland security agencies have 
allocated significant resources to the identification and neutralization of radicalization.  
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The DHS has shifted significant analytical resources to this problem.150  The New York 
City Police Department (NYPD), in August 2007, issued a report titled, Radicalization in 
the West:  The Homegrown Threat.  The report reiterated that radicalization is the result 
of “people and environment.” 151   The NYPD report recommends that homeland security 
agencies, particularly law enforcement, examine a mechanism to identify and disrupt the 
radicalization process before an individual engages in criminal activity.152  In essence, it 
advocates an expanded role for law enforcement participation in non-law enforcement-
related intelligence gathering and disruption operations.   
Despite European concerns, the U.S. does not have a radicalization problem.  
American Muslims are well-adjusted and beneficial members of our society.  By shifting 
the threat from terrorist attack planning to radicalization, the U.S. is needlessly expanding 
our struggle, while potentially increasing the negative perception of Muslim Americans.  
This tactic may in fact increase the very process it was designed to prevent.   
It is apparent that the U.S. has not prepared itself against the worldwide radical 
Islamist insurgency.   Our current strategy is one of limited engagement that selectively 
targets a small percentage of our enemies.  In order to alter our continued vulnerability, 
the U.S. must devise a strategy that will support the homeland while engaging the entire 
spectrum of radical Islamists.   
What is clear is that the U.S. has not been attacked since 9/11.  Despite the 
development of the War on Terror and the maturation of the homeland security 
community, the U.S. is not capable of identifying, disrupting and neutralizing all possible 
terrorist attacks.  Al Qaeda and its supporters in the radical Islamic community continue 
to attack U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These terrorists have conducted numerous 
terrorist attacks throughout the world.  The only notable exception is the U.S.  Based on 
the facts identified earlier, the only logical explanation is that the terrorists are unable or 
unwilling to attack the U.S.  If they are incapable of attacking, it stands to reason that 
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their inability lies in their ability to recruit operatives to attack the U.S.  However, the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the plots and attacks in Morocco, Spain, Germany, 
United Kingdom and Denmark would indicate that these groups do not have a shortage of 
recruits who would be willing to engage in terrorist’s attacks.   
We must continue to develop a process by which we can secure our borders and 
maintain internal control over the limited pool of radical Islamic extremists in the U.S.; 
however, this can not be at the expense of our economic and social well-being.  It is only 
when we fail to ensure our internal stability that we will become truly vulnerable to the 
terrorist threat.  
As seen in the previous chapters, there appears to be misunderstanding as to the 
threat we face.  One group believes we have not adequately prepared for or addressed the 
threat.  This group believes the U.S. engaged in a clash of civilizations.  They argue that 
the U.S. must significantly alter its resources to counteract this momentous and growing 
threat.  As outlined in this chapter, another faction believes the U.S. has exaggerated the 
threat.  This group argues that the U.S. response has been extensively disruptive to the 
overall safety of the U.S.  Regardless of the criticism, both groups believe the U.S. has 
incorrectly identified the threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.  To identify a solution, 
we must examine the government’s current counterterrorism strategy.  The following 
chapter will examine the national strategies related to counterterrorism as well as the 
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IV. THE CURRENT NATIONAL STRATEGY 
Today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually 
any weapon. 
— 2002 U.S. National Strategy on Homeland Security153  
 
Since 9/11, we have taken the fight to these terrorists and extremists. We 
will stay on the offense, we will keep up the pressure, and we will deliver 
justice to our enemies. 
— George W. Bush154  
 
The United States drastically altered its counterterrorism strategy after the attacks 
on September 11, 2001.  Prior to the attacks, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy was 
viewed as primarily a law enforcement issue.  Victory was defined as a successful 
prosecution.  This strategy was solidified in President Clinton’s Presidential Decision 
Directive 39 (PDD 39), which appointed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the 
U.S. government entity responsible for leading U.S. counterterrorism efforts.155   As the 
lead counterterrorist agency, the FBI utilized the criminal justice system to identify, 
disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities that targeted the U.S.  Under this framework, the 
FBI worked to prevent terrorist attacks; however, the most significant application of its 
resources was dedicated to responding to terrorist attacks after they occurred.  Despite its 
response-based focus, only two significant terrorist attacks occurred in the U.S. prior to 
9/11: the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing and the first attack on the World 
Trade Center.   
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Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. determined this strategy was ineffective 
against the terrorist threat.156  In hindsight, many felt the criminal justice system provided 
radical Islamists with protections that were not compatible with the threat they posed.  On 
September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress in 
which he outlined his “War on Terror.”157  In his address, President Bush defined our 
enemy as al Qaeda and “every terrorist group of global reach.”158  Their goal is 
“remaking the world — and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.”159   
President Bush declared that “freedom and fear are at war.”160  After defining the War on 
Terror, President Bush warned that it was not going to be “one battle, but a lengthy 
campaign.”161  At stake was our country’s existence.  President Bush advised that the 
War on Terror was the “world’s…and civilization’s fight.”162   
In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security released the “National Strategy for 
Homeland Security.”163  In the strategy’s preface, President Bush declared: 
We are today a Nation at risk to a new and changing threat.  The terrorist 
threat to America takes many forms, has many placed to hide, and is often 
invisible.164 
For the first time, the U.S. government provided a definition of homeland 
security.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security outlined three strategic 
objectives:   
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1. Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
2. Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 
3. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.165 
 
For the first time, the strategy defined the functions of homeland security as: 
1. Intelligence and Warning; 
2. Border and Transportation Security; 
3. Domestic Counterterrorism; 
3. Protecting Critical Infrastructure; 
4. Defend Against Catastrophic Terrorism; and 
5. Emergency Preparedness and Response.166  
 
The purpose of the strategy was to “mobilize and organize our Nation and to 
secure the U.S. from terrorist attacks.”167 
The Strategy warned that, “Today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, 
and with virtually any weapon.”168  To confront this threat, the Strategy hoped to 
“mobilize and organize” our defenses.169  To accomplish its stated goals, the Strategy 
instructed the U.S. to, “take every appropriate action to avoid being surprised by another 
terrorist attack.”170  It provided a “national vision” for the redefinition of law 
enforcement’s mission from the criminal justice to the “prevention of all terrorist acts 
                                                 
165 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, vii. 
166 Ibid., vii.  
167 Ibid., 1.  
168 Ibid., 1. 
169 Ibid., 1.  
170 Ibid., 15.  
 48
within the U.S.”171  To support this mission, the Strategy advised the U.S. would devote 
the “right amount of scarce resources to homeland security and to spend these resources 
on the right activities.”172 
In February 2003, the U.S. released a companion strategy titled, the “National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism.”173  The purpose of this strategy was to “identify and 
defuse threats before they reach our borders.”174  To accomplish its goals, the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism defined its strategic intent as the defeat of terrorists of 
global reach; deny support and sanctuary; diminish underlying conditions; and defend the 
U.S.175  To defeat terrorists, the Counterterrorism Strategy called for identification, 
location and destruction of terrorist groups.  The U.S. military, law enforcement, 
intelligence and agencies and our foreign liaison partners were tasked with this mission; 
however, the U.S. Department of State was selected to “lead regional strategies.”176 
To deny terrorist support and sanctuary, the Counterterrorism Strategy called for 
the development and maintenance of international standards for combating terrorism: the 
strengthening and maintenance of internal counterterrorism efforts and the disruption of 
material support to terrorists.177  In an effort to diminish the root causes of terrorism, the 
Counterterrorism Strategy mandated that the U.S. must win the “war of ideas.”  In order 
to accomplish this, the U.S. must work with international partners to strengthen weak 
states to prevent the development and/or re-emergence of terrorism.178 
The Strategy for Combating Terrorism’s external operations goal clearly 
separated it from the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  However, it called for the 
utilization of “every instrument of national powers: diplomatic, economic, law 
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enforcement, financial, information, intelligence and military.”179  To defend the U.S. 
against terrorism, the Counterterrorism Strategy called for the implementation of the 
previously discussed National Strategy for Homeland Security.  To support its goals, the 
Strategy called for the development of “domain awareness,” and the development of 
enhanced measures to ensure the “integrity, reliability and availability” of critical 
infrastructures at home and abroad. 180 The strategy called for the development on an 
integrated incident management system to ensure our ability to address attacks should 
they occur.181 
In the fall of 2006, the U.S. issued an updated National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism.  The updated Counterterrorism Strategy declared we are at war with a 
“transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred and 
oppression.”182  Al Qaeda is deemed to be the most dangerous supporter of this 
movement.  These movements are intent on destroying the “nature” and “destiny” of the 
world.  Al Qaeda and its supporters want to institute “totalitarian rule” through and 
ideology of oppression, violence and hatred. 183 These extremist organizations are 
attempting to “create and exploit a division between the Muslim and non-Muslim world.” 
184  These groups will not allow a peaceful coexistence.  Like the earlier version, this 
Strategy defined this as a war of arms and ideas.  It declared the U.S. had, “broken old 
orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal 
justice domain.”185  This allowed the U.S. to use all elements of its “National Power” to 
“extend our (counterterrorism) defenses.”186  It asserted several key measures of success 
since 9/11: the degradation of the al Qaeda network, the death and capture of key al 
Qaeda lieutenants, the elimination of terrorist safe havens and the disruption of terrorism 
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support networks.187   These successes were the result of increased cooperation between 
law enforcement, intelligence, military and diplomacy.188  This cooperation was 
complemented by the enhancement of our counterterrorism architecture; specifically, the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center.  These new intelligence 
components assisted in the disruption of “several serious plots.”189   
The updated Counterterrorism Strategy declared that terrorism does not originate 
from poverty, U.S. Iraq Policy, Israeli/Palestinian Conflict or our counterterrorism 
efforts.190  It determined that terrorism is a result of “political alienation,” “grievances 
that can be blamed on others,” “subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation,” and an 
“ideology that justifies murder.”   
In order to build upon its stated successes, the new Counterterrorism Strategy 
redefined the U.S. policy for winning the War on Terror.  The new Counterterrorism 
Strategy identified several long-term and short term-goals.  The long-term plan called for 
the “advancement of effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of 
terrorism.”  Through these efforts, a U.S.-led “freedom agenda” supported effective 
worldwide democratic institutions’ support of human liberty, freedom and dignity.191  
The new Counterterrorism strategy stated, “Democracy is antithesis of terrorist 
tyranny.”192  This would “allow for ownership in society; rule of law with peaceful 
resolution; freedom of speech; and respect for human dignity.”193  The most perceptible 
measure of success for this element will be the establishment of free and fair elections.  
The Strategy cautions that democratic empowerment may increase the activity of 
“homegrown terrorists.” 194 
                                                 
187 The White House, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,”1.  
188 Ibid., 3.  
189 Ibid., 3.  
190 Ibid., 9.  
191 Ibid., 1.  
192 Ibid., 10.  
193 Ibid., 10.  
194 Ibid., 9.  
 51
The new Counterterrorism Strategy defined its short-term goal as the prevention 
of attacks by terrorist networks.  To succeed, the new Counterterrorism Strategy called 
for an attack on terrorist leaders, operators, weapons, financial networks, communication 
activities and propaganda operations.195  These goals will help to eliminate physical, 
legal, cyber and financial safe havens.196  The strategy described offensive and defense 
goals and objectives.  Defensively, the U.S. must deny terrorists international travel to 
include entry into the U.S.  The U.S. must defend potential targets, including critical 
infrastructure and key resources.  The Strategy warns that terrorists have sought to exploit 
our vulnerabilities by focusing their efforts on our soft targets: schools, restaurants, 
modes of transportation, historical attractions, high profile events and places of 
worship.197    
Offensively, the U.S. must strive to deny the ability of rogue states, specifically 
Iran and Syria, to provide support and sanctuary to terrorist organizations.198  The U.S. 
must also prevent terrorist organizations from gaining control of any nation.  With this 
document, the U.S. hoped to institutionalize the War on Terror strategy for “long-term 
success.”  In doing so, the U.S. hoped to: establish and maintain international standards 
of responsibility; strengthen domestic and international partnerships; improve 
government structure and interagency partnerships; and promote intellectual and human 
capital improvement.199  
In October 2007, the Homeland Security Council issued a new National Strategy 
for Homeland Security.200  This strategy was written as a companion to the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism.201  The new homeland security strategy outlined four 
goals: 
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1. Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; 
2. Protect the American people, critical infrastructure and key resources; 
3. Respond and recover to incidents; and   
4. Strengthen the homeland security “foundation.”202 
 
The most significant aspect of the new strategy is its acknowledgement that 
homeland security may encompass threats outside of terrorism.  Although it failed to alter 
the official definition of homeland security, it took into account the expanded benefits 
from a robust homeland security system.203   This is in stark contrast to the earlier 
homeland security strategy that focused exclusively on terrorism.  This appears to be the 
result of criticisms of the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina.  Another 
update was a redefinition of the threat.  In the first homeland security strategy, our 
adversary was identified generically as terrorists.   
The 2007 Homeland Security Strategy identified the terrorist threat as “violent 
Islamic terrorist groups and cells.”204  It calls on federal, state, local, tribal agencies and 
our citizens together in a collaborative environment.  In a significant departure from 
earlier strategies, it outlines the federal government’s role in the process.205 It calls for 
the federal government to lead “where it has a constitutional mandate or where it 
possesses unique capabilities.”   These unique capabilities include; border security, 
intelligence and weapons of mass destruction. 206  The strategy re-confirms that 
“America’s constitutional foundations of federalism and limited government…place 
significant trust and responsibilities in the capabilities of state and local governments to 
help protect the American people.”207  It also calls on the private and non-profit sectors, 
the American people and our international liaison partners to play a key role in the 
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national homeland security effort.208   The changes in the updated Homeland Security 
Strategy were brought about by our measured success in the War on Terror.  Since the 
first Homeland Security Strategy, the U.S. has increased its counterterrorism effort, 
initiated a multi-layered approach to homeland security, secured the border, developed 
“targeted, risk-based delivery of federal grants” and developed a national homeland 
security exercise program.  These efforts allowed the U.S. to disrupt “multiple, 
potentially deadly plots against the U.S. since September 11.” 209 
Despite these successes, the strategy acknowledges several challenges that still 
need to be addressed.  The most significant is the acknowledgement that the War on 
Terror is a “generational struggle.”  The threat posed by our adversaries will not be 
neutralized in a timely manner.  The U.S. will need to design and implement adaptive 
counterterrorism strategies for the foreseeable future.  In this struggle, because of its 
perceived length, the U.S. must guard against complacency.  The strategy advises that the 
U.S. needs to “balance the sense of optimism that is fundamental to the American 
character with the sober recognition that despite our best efforts, future catastrophes— 
natural and man-made — will occur.”210  Other concerns were homegrown 
radicalization, complacency, risk measurement, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) reform and the re-alignment of congressional oversight committees.  
The homeland security strategy identified the main threat as a “persistent and 
evolving terrorist threat, primarily from violent Islamic terrorist groups and cells.”211  
The most significant of these threats continues to be al Qaeda.  Since the attacks on 9/11, 
al Qaeda has been able to continue and evolve.  Since the start of the War on Terror, al 
Qaeda has been able to protect its top leadership; replenish its operational lieutenants; 
shift its safe haven from Afghanistan to Pakistan and continue to increase cooperation 
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with regional terrorist organizations.212  These factors have allowed al Qaeda to continue 
to possess “core capabilities” that could be used to facilitate another attack in the U.S.213 
Despite the ability and intentions, the strategy acknowledges that the U.S. has 
only located “a handful” of U.S.-based terrorists who possessed links to senior al Qaeda 
leadership.  However, these “small number(s)” of individuals raise the possibility that 
there may be others.214   
To address these deficiencies, the 2007 Homeland Security Strategy sought to 
harness the national equities of U.S. power: diplomatic, informational, military, 
economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement.  In this strategy, our “national 
power” would be focused on the prevention, response to and recovery from natural and 
man-made attacks on our homeland.215  Like early strategies, the prevention of terrorist 
attacks relies on our ability to identify and disrupt the development of terrorists and 
terrorist operations.  A key component addressed the government’s ability to prevent the 
radicalization of individuals into adherents of violent Islamic extremism.216 This anti-
radicalization element encouraged the engagement of “key communities” in the War on 
Terror.  It called on law enforcement to identify and counter sources of radicalization.  It 
stressed the need for federal, state and local agencies to “strengthen institutions and 
human resources” in order to educate law enforcement on Islamic culture and norms.  In 
doing so, we should be able to progress our understanding of radicalism while we 
improve our cooperation and information-sharing capabilities.217  Combined with the 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
hoped to provide a prescription for victory in the War on Terror.   
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These community-wide strategic documents are designed to direct all 
counterterrorist actions, particularly the Office of the Director on National Intelligence 
(ODNI) and its component organization the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  
These strategies were augmented by department and agency-level strategies, specifically 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  DHS is made up of twenty-two agencies, including, the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis within DHS headquarters.   
In 2004, then Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge announced 
the department’s strategy in “Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan.”218   The DHS strategy declared the threat to be an “assault on 
the ideals that make our nation great.”219  To meet this threat, the DHS strategy called for 
DHS to “lead the unified effort to secure America.”220  With that mandate, DHS chose to 
focus on “protection and preparedness.”221  DHS hoped to accomplish this through seven 
inter-related goals: Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response, Recovery, Service and 
Organizational Excellence.222 
To accurately identify the threat, DHS focused on a multi-pronged effort to 
“gather and fuse” terrorism-related intelligence.  Concurrently, they intended to “identify 
and assesses” the vulnerability of the U.S.’s critical infrastructure.223  In an effort to 
prevent a terrorist attack, DHS sought to secure the border, enforce trade and immigration 
laws and strengthen the nation’s transportation systems.224   
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DHS sought to target these areas so they would be able to protect and safeguard 
“our people and their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property and economy from 
terrorism, natural disasters and other emergencies.”225  If unable to accomplish these 
goals, the DHS strategy called for a response capability to “lead, manage and coordinate 
the national response (and recovery) to acts of terrorism, natural disasters and other 
emergencies.”226  DHS hoped to accomplish these goals while developing an 
organization of excellence that was focused on its ability to facilitate lawful trade, travel 
and immigration.227 
In 2003, the FBI issued its Strategic Plan for 2004-2009.  In this plan, the FBI 
reiterated its number-one priority to protect the U.S. from terrorist attack.228  The FBI 
plan identified terrorism as the most significant national security threat to the U.S.  The 
FBI plan established the FBI’s goal is to prevent, disrupt and defeat terrorist operations 
before they occur. 229  
FBI investigations have revealed an “extensive militant Islamic presence in the 
U.S.”  The FBI determined these militants are involved in fundraising, recruitment and 
training.  The FBI plan reiterated that they “could” also be activated to carryout attacks in 
the U.S.  Of these militants, the FBI plan identified al Qaeda “attack cells” as the greatest 
threat.230 
To accomplish this goal, the plan stated the FBI must “evolve to address 
tomorrow’s threats.”   The plan called for the development of an enterprise-wide 
intelligence program that focused on seven “global drivers:”231 
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1. Global and domestic demographic changes; 
2. Communication revolution; 
3. Global economic changes; 
4. Rising international belief in anti-materialistic values; 
5. Technical revolution; 
6. Security technology revolution; and  
7. Changing role of states and laws.  
By continually evaluating these drivers, the FBI plan hopes to address the fluid 
nature of today’s asymmetric threat.  The FBI plan predicted several changes in terrorist 
organizations.  Specifically, a reduction in state-sponsored terrorism; an increase in 
independent terrorist organizations; an increase in cooperation between terrorist groups; 
and a continued interest in the possession and utilization of weapons of mass 
destruction.232   
To meet the changing threat, the FBI plan called for the continued reliance on 
three key mission areas: intelligence, investigation and partnerships.233  To prevent 
terrorist attacks, the FBI plan focuses on the expansion of the FBI’s intelligence base; 
increasing human intelligence collection (HUMINT); increase partnerships on Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs); and provide timely, accurate intelligence and 
information sharing.234  Second, the FBI plan calls for the FBI to deny terrorists the 
capacity to plan, organize and carryout logistical, operational and support activities.  To 
accomplish its deniability goal; the FBI plan calls for the enhancement of operational and 
intelligence emerging techniques; increased foreign liaison and the utilization of 
appropriate sanctions.235 
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The FBI, fortunately, realizes that it may not be able to prevent all terrorist 
attacks.  Consequently, the FBI plan calls for the capacity to provide incident response 
and investigative capabilities.  In particular, the FBI plan calls for the expansion of its Fly 
Team and Rapid Deployment Teams; increased crisis management capabilities within 
FBI field offices; and increased crisis management training.    The FBI plan provides 
clear guidance for the identification and response capabilities for weapons of mass 
destruction.  The FBI plan outlines field office requirements for divisional weapons of 
mass destruction coordinators.  These coordinators are mandated to develop a WMD 
working group within each field division.236   Throughout its plan, the FBI 
acknowledges its past mistakes, identifies its current capabilities and provides guidance 
for its continued transformation into a domestic security service focused on the protection 
of our homeland.  
Many states and local homeland security agencies have adopted key 
recommendations from the various federal strategies.  In particular, many agencies have 
adopted the need to develop a robust domestic intelligence collections capability.  In an 
effort to become a more effective consumer and producer of intelligence, many state, 
local and tribal agencies have adopted an intelligence-led policing strategy.  This strategy 
focuses on the operational environment of a particular law enforcement agency.  
Environmental intelligence is utilized by decision makers within all levels of homeland 
security to create a more effective homeland security strategy.237   
As documented above, the U.S. has a developed a broad national counterterrorism 
strategy.  This strategy, unfortunately, does not address the current terrorist threat to the 
U.S.  Conceptually, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy fails to comprehend the actual 
threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.  The next chapter will attempt to solidify the 
actual threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.   These strategies do not address the most 
common criticisms of our counterterrorism apparatus.  As outlined in the previous 
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chapters, there is a significant divergence of opinions as to the threat posed by radical 
Islamic terrorists.  To develop and implement a unified strategy, the U.S. must make a 
practical examination of the actual threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.  The next 
chapter will attempt to place the threat in an appropriate context.  Once completed, this 
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V. THE THREAT 
No one can terrorize a whole nation, unless we are all his accomplices. 
— Edward R. Murrow 238   
 
 
For the past several decades, the U.S. has strived to identify and respond to the 
tangible threat posed by radical Islamic terrorist organizations.  By definition, terrorists 
operate in a clandestine environment in which they hope to manipulate and influence the 
public’s perception of their goals and capabilities.  In this capacity, radical Islamic 
terrorists have been extremely successful.  The attacks on 9/11 had a significant impact 
on American’s psyche that far outweighed the physical costs of the attacks.  As 
documented in earlier chapters, the U.S. has been unable to come to a consensus on the 
threat posed by radical Islamic terrorist organizations.  Although significant, the attacks 
on 9/11 need to be placed into a proper context in order to fully understand their 
implications.  Building upon the issues and evidence identified in earlier chapters, this 
chapter will provide an overview of the current threat.   
Radical Islamic terrorist organizations are a significant threat to the U.S. and its 
interests.  Their ideology and actions, however, do not have a direct ability to destroy our 
way of life.  This does not mean we are invulnerable.  The U.S. must calculate the current 
threat and design and implement an effective counterterrorism strategy.  It is essential 
that we recognize that our reaction to terrorists and terrorist attacks can have a more 
negative impact on our way of life than an actual terrorist attack.  With this in mind, it is 
imperative that we view the threat in the proper context.  This framework will strengthen 
the U.S. ability to counteract the threat and strengthen our country.   
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A. HISTORY 
The U.S. is, arguably, the world’s sole remaining superpower.  If history is any 
indication, we will not be the last.  As the U.S. constantly evaluates its place in the world, 
it is important to remember how we arrived at this juncture.  To assess our role, it is 
necessary to take a look at where we have been.  
On the eve of World War II, the U.S. was embroiled in the Depression.  Large 
portions of our citizenry were out of work.  The Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration 
established an expanded social welfare system that enabled numerous individuals to 
function during this crisis.239  At the same time, many individuals and governments 
correctly identified the rise of the Nazi party in Germany as a threat to civilization.  At 
the start of the war, Nazi Germany possessed the world’s largest and most 
technologically advanced army.240   Germany’s military prowess was displayed in the 
invasions of Poland and France.  The German/USSR treaty solidified Germany’s 
dominance in the world.  Germany, in words and actions, had established its desire and 
ability to dominate Europe and, if possible, the rest of the world.241  At the same time, the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent Declaration of War brought the U.S. 
into direct confrontation with Japan and its allies, Germany and Italy.242  In response, the 
U.S. and its allies fought and won a decisive war that would have implications for the 
remainder of the twentieth century and into the next.   Throughout the war, in which 
millions of civilians and combatants lost their lives, the U.S. civilian population remained 
relatively secure.  Although the threat of invasion remained, most Americans believed 
that the U.S., and its allies, would be successful in stopping the spread of violence to the 
U.S. mainland.  Through extensive military, diplomatic and intelligence operations, the 
U.S. was able to make that a reality.   
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The end of World War II brought the rise of the Cold War, a battle between 
Democracy and Communism.   In this fight, the U.S. and the Soviet Union supported a 
worldwide clash for power.  The U.S. and the Soviet Union utilized economic, social, 
military and intelligence means to influence and control proxy governments.  This 
influence allowed the two countries to compete without ever engaging in a direct military 
conflict.243   
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War was over.  For the first time 
in more than sixty years, the U.S. found itself without a worldwide adversary.  A lack of 
significant military and economic competition provided the U.S. with the ability to 
evaluate its new position in the world.  This discourse focused on the ability of the U.S. 
to ensure its social, economic and physical well-being.  As the only remaining 
superpower, many believed we had the power to unilaterally mandate our place in the 
world.  Since the end of World War II, the only recognized threat to the U.S. was from 
other state actors.  Of these threats, only those countries that possessed nuclear weapons 
were deemed true threats.  The capabilities of non-state actors played a limited role in our 
internal debate over the security of our homeland.     
The continental U.S. had not been attacked from an outside military force since 
the War of 1812.  This created a psychological perception of invulnerability.  The 
perceived invulnerability has played an immeasurable role in the overall development of 
the U.S. national security strategy.  Many believed we were effectively impervious to a 
significant domestic attack.  It was believed that the policy of mutually assured 
destruction and the collapse of the Soviet Union effectively neutralized the threat of 
nuclear war. 
Unknown to most Americans at the time, but clearly evident now, was the rise of 
radical Islamic terrorist organizations.  Since the mid-1990s, radical Islamic terrorists, 
particularly al Qaeda, had increased their rhetoric and attacks against the U.S.244   
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Terrorism was viewed as primarily a law-enforcement problem.  The U.S. designated the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation as the lead federal agency responsible for 
counterterrorism.245    
The attacks of 9/11 were the culmination of al Qaeda’s actions and statements.246  
Prior to the attacks, prominent counterterrorism experts, in and outside of the 
government, provided ample warning to our leaders about the inevitability of a 
significant domestic terrorist attack.  These warnings went unheeded.247  Many leaders 
viewed the threat and attacks as the cost of remaining the world’s sole superpower.   
The events of 9/11 provided an unwelcome view of our ever-present 
vulnerabilities.  The attacks, unfortunately, caught the majority of the U.S. completely 
unaware.  This lack of awareness has had a deep psychological impact on the nation.  It 
has had an effect on the evaluation of the perceived economic and physical costs of the 
attacks.  Our nation’s invulnerability was fully ingrained in the culture of our society.  
The attacks shattered that illusion.   It caused our citizenry to question the very 
foundations of our nation.   For the first time in generations, the civilian population of the 
U.S. was threatened from the outside.  The sense of vulnerability was enhanced by the 
government’s inability to define the threat and to develop a coherent plan to defend 
against further attacks.   
It is with this understanding that we can evaluate our response to the attacks and 
prepare ourselves for the future.  The general ignorance of terrorism by our leaders and 
the citizenry influenced the way in which we would define and fight this new problem.  
On September 20, 2001, President Bush declared a War on Terror.248    In his address, 
President Bush defined our enemy as al Qaeda and “every terrorist group of global 
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reach.”249  Their goal is “remaking the world — and imposing its radical beliefs on 
people everywhere.”250   President Bush declared that, “freedom and fear are at war.”251  
After defining the War on Terror, President Bush warned that was not going to be “one 
battle, but a lengthy campaign.”252  At stake was our country’s existence.  President Bush 
advised that the War on Terror was the “world’s…and civilization’s fight.”253  This 
speech set the guidelines for the way in which the U.S. would confront terrorism.   
At the time, the speech seemed appropriate to the perceived threat.  Now, more 
than six years later, we must reevaluate its relevance in context of the current threat.  As 
with any threat, we must take into account a wide variety of factors.  The U.S., regardless 
of our actions, will always be vulnerable to terrorism.  No matter what we do, how much 
we spend, whom we arrest, kill or invade, we will be vulnerable.  The question becomes, 
“What is the threat?”   
An evaluation of the threat illustrates two inarguable facts: 
1. Radical Islamic terrorist organizations are active throughout the world; 
2. The U.S. homeland has not been attacked by radical Islamic extremists 
since 9/11. 
These divergent facts indicate that something may be different in the U.S. than in 
the rest of the world.  A review and analysis of these differences will help the U.S. to 
devise a more effective counterterrorism strategy.   
B. DOMESTIC  
The definitive government evaluation of the current threat, the National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), indicates that the U.S. will face a “persistent and evolving 
terrorist threat over the next three years.”  The main threat to the U.S. would be from 
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Islamic terrorists, especially al Qaeda.  The NIE assesses that, “al Qaeda has protected or 
regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capabilities.”  The NIE argues that al 
Qaeda will “intensify” its efforts to bring its operatives into the U.S.  According to the 
report, al Qaeda will continue to focus its attack planning on “prominent political, 
economic and infrastructure targets.”254  The goal of these attacks will be to provide 
innovative, “visually dramatic” destruction, inflict mass casualties and cause significant 
economic aftershocks.  This assessment was supported by the February 2008, Director of 
National Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessment for the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence.255  The DNI Threat Assessment highlighted the overseas threat posed by al 
Qaeda and other radical Islamic terrorist organizations.  In particular, it illuminated a 
resurgent al Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.  The 
DNI estimates that this has allowed al Qaeda to improve the last critical areas of 
preparation needed to attack the U.S. homeland.256  The NIE noted that al Qaeda 
continues to express a desire to obtain and utilize weapons of mass destruction.257  A key 
point to make is that neither the NIE nor the DNI Annual Assessment says that radical 
Islamic terrorists pose a threat to the existence of the U.S.  In fact, in the past year, the 
U.S. has only disrupted two plots tied to radical Islamic terrorists.258   
In May 2007, the FBI disrupted a group of European and Arab Muslim 
immigrants who had planned to attack Ft. Dix, New Jersey.259   Since the arrests, some 
have called into question the actual threat posed by this group.  Although they were 
clearly intent on causing harm, it has been shown that these individuals did not have the 
capability to conduct a large-scale attack on the U.S.  In no way should this minimize the 
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actions of law enforcement; however, it does indicate that the FBI and its partners are in a 
position to successfully identify and disrupt these types of operations prior to an 
attack.260 
In June 2006, the FBI disrupted a plot by seven individuals in Miami, Florida, 
who planned to attack the Sears Tower in Chicago, Illinois.  At the time of the arrests, 
FBI Deputy Director John Pistole described the group as “more aspirational than 
operational.”261  Once again, a newly re-designed FBI and its enhanced homeland 
security partners were able to successfully identify and disrupt and attack before it 
occurred.   
The scope and aspirations of these radical Islamic terrorists pale in comparison to 
other terrorists operating outside of the U.S.  An examination of these external threats 
leads one to believe that the threat is real and may be growing. 
C. INTERNATIONAL  
The U.S. is not Europe, the Middle East or South East Asia.  We are 
geographically and culturally separated.  The Muslim population in the U.S. is 
significantly different from a majority of other countries.  A Pew Research Institute study 
indicated that U.S. Muslims are better off financially and are more mainstream than their 
U.K. counterparts.262  As a result, Muslims in U.K. and Western Europe are also 
significantly more extreme than their equivalents in the U.S.263  It is important to 
remember that what happens in these countries does not mean it is predestined to happen 
in the U.S.   
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Since 9/11, the U.K. has been victim to two terrorist attacks as well as numerous 
plots that were thwarted by intelligence agencies and law enforcement.  In November 
2006, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the British Security Service (MI-5), 
confirmed that they have a significant number of radical Islamic terrorists who were 
actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts in the U.K.264  This is in sharp 
contrast to the statements made by homeland security executives in the U.S.265   As 
outlined above, the threat to the U.S. homeland is very different from the threat posed to 
our European allies.  It is essential that we keep this in mind when we evaluate and assess 
the threat to the U.S.   
Proponents of the clash of civilizations model view the threat as a generational 
struggle between civilizations.  In The West’s Last Chance, senior editor for the 
Washington Times Tony Blankley argues that the West is engaged in a battle where the 
“Threat is every bit as great…as was the threat of the Nazis taking over Europe in the 
1940s.”266  Blankley argues that the threat is not limited to radical Islamic extremists, but 
includes all Muslims.267  This is hypothesis is not true and may actually be making things 
worse.  Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, believes this “us versus 
them” narrative is actually hurting our fight and may actually serve as a “platform and 
catalyst” for the radicalization process.268    
Unlike Nazi Germany and the former Soviet Union, there is not a clearly 
identified radical Islamic leader or organization.  Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda may 
serve as an inspirational guide, but they do not control all radical Islamic terrorists or 
even a significant portion of them.  Furthermore, Radical Islamic fundamentalism is not a 
single unified force within Islam.  Samuel Huntington illustrates the division when he 
discussed his clash of civilizations model.269  Islam, like most religions, is made up of 
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different groups and/or sects that profess differing interpretations of the religions tenants.  
In Islam, the largest separation is between the Sunni and Shia sects.  Within this division, 
each group possesses its own version of extremists.  Al Qaeda and its affiliates are often 
described as adherents of the Salafi or Wahabbi sects of Sunni Islam.270  Afghanistan and 
Iraq are only the most recent examples of civil strife between various Islamic sects.   
DHS Secretary Chertoff’s 2007 Op-ed for the Washington Post continued to 
perpetuate the clash of civilizations mythos when he stated that the current threat is 
comparable to “historical totalitarian ideologies.”271  As with many other clash of 
civilizations adherents, Chertoff utilizes Usama Bin Laden and other al Qaeda members 
declarations of war against the U.S. as evidence of a war.  This viewpoint, unfortunately, 
perpetuates they myth that radical Islamic terrorist are an omnipresent and unified group 
bent on the destruction and domination of the U.S.  Instead, the U.S. needs to focus on 
Chertoff’s later advice to evaluate radical Islamic terrorists by their “intent, capability 
and consequence.”272  In order to confront the threat, the U.S. must place the threat in 
proper context.  Chertoff writes that radical Islamists have started a war to dominate all 
countries. These “clash of civilizations” evaluations elevate the threat to an omnipotent 
organization capable of destroying the U.S. 
What is clear, despite all the rhetoric, is that terrorists do not possess the ability to 
destroy the U.S.  The most significant damage caused by terrorist attacks continues to be 
our response to them.  As a country, our most dangerous enemies continue to emanate 
from outside the U.S.   In order to minimize the overall damage, we must focus our 
counterterrorist efforts on the external terrorist threat.  Building upon the framework 
discussed in previous chapters, the final chapter documents the current status and offers a 
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VI. THE TRUE CONFLICT:  A RADICAL ISLAMIC 
INSURGENCY   
For the past several decades, the U.S. has strived to identify and respond to the 
tangible threat posed by radical Islamic terrorist organizations.  Previous chapters 
outlined the current counterterrorism strategy, prevalent criticisms and evaluation of the 
current threat.  In the final chapter, I will synthesize my conclusions into a strategic 
memorandum to the next president of the United States.  It is my hope, that this 
memorandum will influence the development of the next phase in our struggle against 





To:  Mr. (Mrs.) President 
From:  Thomas J. Sobocinski 
Subject: The True Conflict:  A Racial Islamic Insurgency 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As president, you will be called upon to address many issues and crises.  
Terrorism will, obviously, be at the forefront of your concerns.  In order to prepare 
yourself for this confrontation, you must understand several key areas.   
Most important, the U.S. is not engaged in a war on terror.  Radical Islamic 
terrorists are only a symptom of a much larger problem.  The U.S. is confronted with a 
radical Islamic insurgency.  Our current counterterrorism strategy is ineffective, and may 
actual hurt our ability to defeat this insurgency.  To increase the safety of our nation, it is 
vital that you implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy towards radical Islam.    
Failure to properly focus our external counterinsurgency operations could have a 
devastating effect on the terrorist threat inside the U.S.   The U.S., thankfully, is not  
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embroiled in a domestic insurgency.  Our domestic counterterrorism apparatus has been, 
and will continue to be, effective against the minimal presence of domestic radical 
Islamic terrorists.    
B. CURRENT STRATEGY 
As with any job, it is important to learn from your predecessor’s successes and 
failures.   Your predecessors’ legacy will be based upon his response following the events 
of September 11, 2001.   After the attacks, President Bush declared a war on terror.  Like 
the “wars” on drugs and poverty, the war on terror is an inadequate slogan used to soothe 
a scared nation.  This jingle, unfortunately, has served as a template for the conduct of 
our counterterrorist operations.    
In order to defeat our adversaries and increase the security of our homeland, it is 
crucial that we correctly identify and evaluate actual threats to national security and 
design a strategy to limit their impact.  The threat, while real, is not as omniscient as you 
were led to believe.  Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and other radical Islamic organizations 
clearly intend to attack the U.S.  They will be successful.  As president, you will be 
unable to prevent them from doing so.  This, however, does not mean you are powerless.   
In reality, we are engaged in a battle against a radical Islamic insurgency.  
Thankfully, this insurgency has yet to develop inside the U.S.  Internally, our adversaries 
are classic terrorists; their domestic support networks are minimal, and the most effective 
terrorist operators will originate from small cellular groups — or will be individual actors 
motivated by external propaganda.  The U.S., thankfully, has been extremely successful 
at identifying and neutralizing these threats.   The changes brought about the attacks on 
9/11 have further strengthened our domestic counterterrorism capabilities. 
Unfortunately, overall, our counterterrorist operations work against us in this 
global insurgency.  Our current counterterrorist operations are designed to capture and 
kill terrorists.  To minimize this insurgency, it is essential that we alter our strategy from 
counterterrorism to counterinsurgency.  Counterterrorist operations focus on the 
identification and neutralization of the terrorist threat.   In counterterrorism operations, 
the threat emanates from the terrorist members.  In counterinsurgency operations, the 
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violent terrorists are but a small participant in the overall fight.  Terrorism is a symptom 
of the overall problem.  Counterinsurgency operations focus on the populations that 
house and recruit terrorists.  Counterinsurgency operations have a comprehensive view of 
individuals and networks that support insurgent activities.  To adequately protect the U.S, 
we must develop a strategy that reflects these differences in the domestic and 
international threat.   
C. THE THREAT  
For decades, the U.S. has strived to define the threat posed by radical Islamic 
terrorists.   In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. experienced the development of violent, 
domestic, left-wing terrorist organizations.  In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. faced a rash 
of overseas kidnappings and hijackings.  In the 1990s, the U.S. saw a rise in significant 
domestic attacks and an increase in coordinated attacks against our military and 
diplomatic interests abroad.273  On September 11, 2001, the U.S. experienced its worst 
domestic attack. This attack had a momentous impact on the United States.  Although the 
attacks had a limited physical impact, the psychological impact was enormous.  For the 
first time since 1812, the U.S. was the victim of a violent attack perpetrated by external 
forces on U.S. soil.   
The most current national threat assessment issued by the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence reveals that the most significant threat to the U.S. stems from 
radical Islamic terrorist organizations.274  Unfortunately, these groups are a small subset 
of a growing radical Islamic insurgency.  Radical Islamic terrorist organizations, such as 
al Qaeda, make up a small percentage of this insurgency.  The actions of these terrorist 
organizations are primarily focused on their own governments and citizenry.  However, 
many radical Islamic terrorist groups have banded together to support terrorist operations 
against the U.S. and its allies. 
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The U.S. is, thankfully, not encumbered with a domestic radical Islamic 
insurgency.  Radical Islamic terrorists inside the U.S. are extremely rare and appear to be 
unrelated to successful radical Islamic terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda.275  The 
post-9/11 changes in our domestic counterterrorism capabilities have successfully 
prepared the U.S. to identify, disrupt and respond to domestic terrorist attacks.  We will 
not prevent all attacks; however, these changes provide an optimum level of protection.  
In order to reduce the international radical Islamic insurgency and prevent a rise in 
internationally directed terrorist attacks against the U.S., it is necessary that the U.S. 
adopt a global counterinsurgency strategy.    
D. RADICAL ISLAMIC INSURGENCY 
Radical Islamic terrorists understand that they will never be able to defeat the 
U.S. in a direct military confrontation.  Consequently, they have chosen to engage in a 
global insurgency.  The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
defines and insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”276   
To thwart this insurgency, the U.S. must recognize and acknowledge the 
insurgency’s goals and objectives, and construct a unified plan to counteract them.   At 
their root, global Islamic insurgent groups believe the U.S. has attacked Islam.  In 
response, they believe they are engaged in a defensive jihad.  A significant portion of this 
jihad is focused on the removal of apostate Middle Eastern regimes and the restoration of 
Islamic caliphate.277   
In insurgent warfare, like terrorism, the most powerful weapon available is fear.  
Insurgents will utilize all available networks to convince you and your fellow political 
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leaders that it would be easier to capitulate than it would be to continue to fight.278  
Insurgencies are focused on winning the war, not the battle.  The global radical Islamic 
insurgency has the potential to develop into a long-term, leaderless struggle of ideas that 
utilizes networks to manipulate you and your fellow leaders’ decision-making processes.    
Put simply, radical Islamic insurgent organizations, such as the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, strive to force the world to conform to the beliefs and practices of early 
Muslim tradition. These groups believe modern life has corrupted Islam.  As a result, 
they do not recognize or endorse current leaders in historically Muslim countries.  Many 
of these groups view the United States and its allies as the main proponent of these 
illegitimate regimes.  As a result, these groups hope to wage a combined holy war, or 
jihad, on current regimes in Muslim countries and in the U.S.  Al Qaeda is the most 
notable terrorist organization associated with these beliefs. 
Unlike our more traditional adversaries, radical Islamic terrorist groups are not 
hierarchically directed movements; they possess no single leader.  Instead, strategic and 
tactical leaders emerge at specific times for specific events.  This lack of structured 
leadership makes insurgent warfare extremely difficult to combat.  This does not mean a 
strike against leadership is ineffectual; however, it is not as effective as in a conventional 
conflict. 
The global Islamic insurgency movement utilizes transnational networks to 
conduct its battles.  These networks encompass all aspects of an insurgency — military, 
economic, communication, political, social and intellectual.  These groups cross 
conventional boundaries and are in a symbiotic relationship with one another. 
Consequently, they are extremely difficult to locate and disrupt.  These groups and 
individuals do not have to share a common belief in the Islamist’s cause.  The networks 
are based on mutually beneficial relationships.  The loyalty and cooperation of these 
groups will ebb and flow throughout the relationship.   
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While conventional wars rely on military force, an insurgency’s power comes 
from its ideas.  In today’s environment, no country or terrorist group has the ability to 
fight a direct battle against the U.S.  As a result, radical Islamic insurgents must rely on 
other means.  Unlike conventional warfare, an insurgent’s most powerful weapon is fear.  
Successful insurgents are adept at formulating a public relations campaign to increase the 
spread of fear.  Because this is a battle of ideas, Islamic insurgents tailor most of their 
actions to support their overall public relations strategy.  Islamic insurgents use a variety 
of channels to propagate a targeted message.  These include the Internet, training, non-
profit organizations and the media.  In particular, the Web provides terrorists throughout 
the world with a simple, anonymous, inexpensive and far-reaching means by which they 
can communicate with one another.  This has allowed Islamic terrorists to create the 
perception of a personal relationship with all of its members.   
This strategy is supported by the insurgency’s unique internal and external 
communication goals.  A clear example of this is the divergent propaganda material 
issued in English versus Arabic.  An examination of Arabic media illustrates these 
differences.  Islamist leaders routinely issue contradictory statements to each audience.  
Tactical events, attacks and battles are just a means used to manipulate internal and 
external opinion.   
Islamic insurgents understand they are engaged in a lengthy struggle.  They 
anticipate that this struggle will be fought over decades, not months and years.279  In 
comparison, the U.S. appears to be unprepared for a fight of that duration.  Since the 
Vietnam War, our leaders and citizens have become accustomed to short, bloodless wars.  
As displayed in Afghanistan and Iraq, if this is not accomplished, our government is 
unable, or unwilling, to refocus its strategy.  Because an insurgency is not a purely 
military struggle, it cannot be restricted into a conventional battlefield or a narrow 
timeframe.  Insurgent organizations do not have a fixed infrastructure.  As a general rule, 
this allows them to focus on offensive operations.  They rely on their supporters to 
provide the day-to-day logistical support.   
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Although we are engaged in a struggle against a radical Islamic insurgency, the 
U.S. is not engaged in a clash of civilizations.  As evidenced by the current dissention 
within Islam, the Muslim world is neither unified nor bent on the overthrow of Western 
civilization.  Classifications such as these empower our enemies and ultimately hurt our 
ability to fight radical Islamic terrorists.  Insurgents turn these generalizations into radical 
Islamic propaganda that reinforces belief amongst their members, and others, that this is a 
war between Islam and the West.280   
E. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY  
Since 9/11, the U.S. has expended considerable time, resources and lives on 
confronting the radical Islamic terrorist threat.  During this time, it has become clear that 
we are not moving in the right direction.  The U.S. needs to concede that it is engaged in 
a long-term struggle against radical Islam.   This, understandably, makes many 
Americans uncomfortable.  The U.S. is a religiously pluralistic society.  The constitution 
clearly affords the American citizenry the ability to worship, or not, in whichever manner 
they choose.  A struggle against radical Islam will force us to question the ideals that 
make up the foundation of our society.  Consequently, it is imperative that we develop 
and utilize a strategy the does not diminish the qualities that make our country what it is.     
My purpose in writing you is not to put forth a new, all-encompassing 
counterinsurgency strategy; these already exist.281  My intention is to encourage you to 
adopt one of these strategies so that the U.S. may effectively combat the true threat to our 
nation.  Having said that, I believe it is essential that the U.S. implement a 
counterinsurgent strategy that will neutralize the growing reach of radical Islam.     
Our current strategy — brought about by the war on terror — has crippled the 
United States’ ability to effectively counteract the radical Islamic insurgency.  Our sole 
focus on capturing and killing terrorists is destined for failure.  These groups continue to 
be able to regenerate after each loss.  This strategy limits the resources available to 
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confront the threat.  A counterinsurgency strategy will allow us to utilize all of our 
governmental and non-governmental national assets.   
Despite the significant changes is our national security apparatus, the U.S. 
government continues to be structured confront conventional threats.  Our bureaucracies 
are made up of hierarchical organizations.  By design, these organizations are focused on 
divergent and specialized missions.  In order to confront a global Islamic insurgency, you 
must implement a system by which all of these assets are leveraged toward one unified 
goal, the reduction of radical Islam.   
To be successful, the U.S. must acknowledge that this is a worldwide battle. Ideas 
are not confined by geographical boundaries and neither should America’s national 
security strategy.  Our current system, which includes the Department of Defense, 
Department of Homeland Security, and other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies — 
specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency — 
restricts effective collaboration.  None of these organizations are situated to lead the U.S. 
in a global counterinsurgency operation.  All of these organizations, except for small 
components, are designed to defend against defined threats — specifically, offensive 
operations directed at capturing or killing terrorist leaders.  Regardless of their “success,” 
these tactics will not allow us to win the war. 
A global counterinsurgency strategy must focus our resources on counteracting 
our opponent’s war of ideas.  The personnel and organizations needed for this are far 
different from the ones utilized for a war on terror.  In a counterinsurgency, we must 
merge our current homeland and national security organizations with a variety of 
individuals and organizations not currently utilized in counterterrorist operations.  These 
specialties should include linguists, sociologists, psychologists, theologians, and experts 
in health, education, critical infrastructure and geopolitics.   
The U.S., unfortunately, does not have an identified leader for the integration of 
these disciplines.  You must clearly articulate a desire for the development, and 
implementation, of this counterinsurgency strategy.  This entity (or individual) must 
possess the authority to mandate operational decisions within our national security 
 79
apparatus.  Once designated, this organization should assist you in guiding the operations 
of our diplomatic, homeland security, military and intelligence agencies.   
If we are to succeed, we must first understand the “war” we face.  This is a war of 
ideas, not bullets.  It has no geographical boundaries or armies.  We must create a system 
within the U.S. to evaluate and counteract these ideas.  Experts should be utilized to 
provide an increase in the health, education and socio-economic status of populations 
who are vulnerable to insurgent influence.  This will allow the U.S. to re-focus these 
populations into behaviors and actions that are beneficial to the U.S. Only through this 
framework will we be able to detect, deter and defeat the threat we face from global 
Islamic extremists.       
F. HOMELAND SECURITY SUCCESS 
A positive development in the war on terror brought a heightened awareness and 
increased coordination on counterterrorism operations.  These changes have significantly 
increased the capabilities of the United States domestic counterterrorism apparatus.  
Unfortunately, the costs of these changes are not proportionate to the amount of security.  
Since the attacks, the U.S. intelligence community has clearly documented its ability to 
identify and disrupt terrorist attack planning.  The newly redesigned FBI, combined with 
the expanded role of state and local law enforcement, has significantly contributed to the 
increased capabilities of the U.S. domestic counterterrorism apparatus.    These changes 
have provided the U.S. with an adequate platform to protect its citizens from the domestic 
counterterrorism threat.  To reduce radical Islamic insurgents’ use of fear, it is important 
that the U.S. communicate this increased sense of safety to its citizens.  The current 
dialogue, unfortunately, continues to focus on our vulnerabilities.  While a realistic 
perspective is important, it needs to include a rational assessment of the domestic threat 
posed by radical Islamic terrorists.   This assessment, combined with a review of our 
restructured domestic counterterrorism capabilities, should provide the information 
needed to calm our citizenry.    
Thankfully, the U.S. is not battling a domestic radical Islamic insurgency.  The 
domestic threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists is significantly less than the threat to 
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our international allies.  In comparison, the U.S. has successfully identified and disrupted 
most radical Islamic terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. homeland.  The most notable 
exceptions were the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the follow-on attacks on 
9/11.  Prior to 9/11, the U.S. recognized the growing threat from radical Islamic terrorists.  
As a result, they initiated a gradual shift within its domestic counterterrorism 
infrastructure.   As the events of 9/11 illustrated, these changes, unfortunately, were not 
enough.   
To address these deficiencies, the U.S. instituted revolutionary changes in the way 
in which it conducts domestic counterterrorism operations.  As an immediate solution, the 
U.S. enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001.282   This 
provided an immediate solution to the division between law enforcement and 
intelligence.  Until its passage, law enforcement and intelligence agencies were unable to, 
or were unclear about, their ability to share intelligence information.  The FBI, in an 
extreme example, established separate intelligence from law enforcement investigative 
units that targeted the same radical Islamic terrorists.  Although bureaucratic obstacles 
remained, the Patriot Act provided unambiguous guidance for intelligence-related 
information sharing and coordination.  The Patriot Act also provided enhancements to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.   These changes provided the legal 
authority for the U.S. to expand its interception of electronic communications.  These 
changes were needed because of the significant technological enhancements of electronic 
communication.  The Internet and cellular telephone communications have become the 
primary means of communication for significant portions of the world, including 
terrorists. 
In an attempt to alter bureaucratic concerns, in March 2003 President George W. 
Bush created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).283    DHS combined more 
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than twenty-two homeland security agencies under one cabinet-level department.  Although 
there have been valid criticisms to the operation of DHS, very few individuals argue with the 
appropriateness of making one individual responsible for the overall mission of homeland 
security.  At a minimum, the position of Secretary of Homeland Security has provided the 
administration with a continued reminder of the varied homeland security issues that face our 
country.   
Aside from the creation of DHS, the most radical change since 9/11 has been the 
transformation of the FBI.  As it developed into, arguably, the most professional law 
enforcement agency in the world, the FBI maintained a strong intelligence component.  With 
the beginning of World War II, the FBI directed its resources toward combating subversion, 
sabotage and espionage.  In 1940, President Roosevelt authorized the creation of the Special 
Intelligence Section (SIS) within the FBI.  The SIS was tasked with the collection of 
intelligence in Latin America.284  After the end of World War II, the FBI’s intelligence 
focus shifted to the fight against communism and the Soviet Union.  After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the FBI reallocated a large percentage of its intelligence cadre toward its law 
enforcement functions.  As the events of 9/11 demonstrated, this was a mistake.   
After 9/11, the FBI embraced the need to refocus its priorities.  This was, admittedly, 
a result of public and administration pressure, as well as an internal understanding that the 
FBI faced a new adversary.  In response, the FBI established the National Security Branch 
(NSB).  The NSB includes the Counterterrorism Division, the Counterintelligence Division, 
the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Directorate of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  These 
divisions are unified under an FBI executive assistant director.285  By creating a clear chain 
of command, the FBI defined the roles and responsibilities of its national security entities.  
By transforming its structure, the FBI demonstrated its culture of preparedness and its 
commitment to the long-term goal of making the United States more secure.     
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One of the key criticisms surrounding 9/11 was the perceived lack of 
communication in the homeland security community.286  In order to increase 
communication and cooperation, the FBI enhanced its Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTF).  The FBI increased its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) from a pre-9/11 level 
of thirty-four to a current total of eighty-four.  JTTFs are made up of state, local and 
federal officers who work counterterrorism matters within the FBI.287  JTTFs are housed 
within FBI space and are the key means by which the FBI conducts counterterrorism 
operations.  These law enforcement officers are deputized as federal agents.  This 
provides enhanced authority for state and local officers to participate in counterterrorist 
operations.  The FBI views these JTTF members as case agents on most domestic 
counterterrorism investigations.  Taskforce officers and FBI Special Agents are assigned 
similar investigations and operations.  Very often, state and local taskforce officers are 
the lead investigators on critical counterterrorism investigations.   
Obviously, taskforce members provide significant benefit to the FBI; however, 
they also provide equitable benefits to their home agencies.  Taskforce officers receive 
training and experience that will be used to support the missions of their home agencies.  
Most significantly, the JTTF provides a means by which ongoing classified operations 
can be discussed and coordinated with state and local homeland security agencies.  These 
agencies have an identified point-of-contact with whom they can address any concerns or 
issues.    These transformational changes have successfully refocused the FBI’s abilities 
towards domestic intelligence collection.   
In an attempt to correct perceived deficiencies, Congress enacted the Intelligence 
Reform and Prevention Act of 2004. 288  The Act was intended “to reform the 
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intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
United States Government.” 289 The Act established the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center.290  These were 
developed to provide leadership, access and coordination for the components of the 
USIC.  The ODNI, specifically NCTC, is the strategic coordinating entity charged with 
merging all facets of U.S. counterterrorism operations.   NCTC is designed to provide 
seamless integration of domestic and international counterterrorism intelligence.  
In order to address the continued perception of a lack of coordination among 
federal, state and local homeland security components, many states have begun to 
independently develop homeland security-related fusion centers.   These fusion centers 
are designed to provide a central point for the integration and analysis of homeland 
security-related intelligence.291  Since 9/11, more than forty-eight fusion centers have 
been developed to assist state homeland security agencies in sharing information and 
intelligence among federal, state and local homeland security professionals.  To ensure 
the viability and success of these fusion centers, DHS has provided more than $380 
million in grants.292 
These changes drastically enhanced the domestic U.S. counterterrorism apparatus.  
As a result, the domestic counterterrorism capabilities of the U.S. are adequately prepared 
to face the current domestic threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.  This is evident by 
the documented disruptions and arrests of the Lakawanna Six, the Portland Seven, 
Zacharias Moussai, the UK/U.S.airline plot and, most recently, the Fort Dix plot.    
It is time to acknowledge our success in transforming the domestic 
counterterrorist capabilities of the U.S.  In doing so, this will allow the counterterrorism 
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community to began to identify and assess the appropriate targets and processes, which 
will ensure the continued security of our homeland.     
G. CONCLUSION  
If we are to expand upon our successes, the U.S. must recognize that the most 
significant threat is not the terrorists themselves, but the infrastructure that supports them.  
This infrastructure is a key component of an overall radical Islamic insurgency.  We must 
alter our strategy to minimize this insurgency while we continue to fight the terrorists 
themselves.   Internally, we can rely on the successful changes in our domestic 
counterterrorism infrastructure.  This shift will allow us to focus our targeting on the 
most significant threat: a foreign-based radical Islamic insurgency.   
 
 
     Respectfully, 
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